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INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, Delaware has dominated the corporate charter competition. It currently supplies more than half
of all public company charters. Delaware’s competitors have
lagged so far behind that some scholars have declared the competition to be over and Delaware the winner. 1
Delaware’s competitive strategy is principally judicial, not
legislative. 2 The Delaware Court of Chancery, which interprets
and enforces the Delaware General Corporation Law, is the
American court most specialized in corporate law. Delaware’s judicial strategy has been highly successful.3 Other states have
tried to emulate it by establishing their own chancery courts, but
financial constraints and state constitutions blocked them. 4
But even with more than half of all public companies in the
United States incorporated in Delaware, the Delaware Chancery
Court’s corporate caseload is small—perhaps only the equivalent
of one-and-a-quarter full-time Chancellors. 5 The United States

1. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (“ The thesis of this Article is
that the very notion that states compete for incorporations is a myth. Other
than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies.”).
2. E.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589 (1990) (“My explanation [for Delaware’s prominence] depends primarily on Delaware’s expert judges. Because of
Delaware’s small size and its many corporate charters, Delaware judges see a
high proportion of corporate cases, and develop corporate expertise.”).
3. E.g., Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder
Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 808 (2015) (referring to the Delaware Court
of Chancery as “a highly regarded judiciary with the proven ability to act swiftly
based upon a developed body of case law”).
4. See, e.g., Implementation of Courts of Chancery: Hearing on Assemb.
Con. Res. 35 Before Nev. Leg. Legis. Comm’n’s Subcomm. to Study the Benefits,
Costs, & Feasibility of the Implementation of Courts of Chancery, 74th Interim
Sess. (Nev. 2008), http://perma.cc/5DVQ-DRF4 (“Senator Care noted that the
creation of a chancery court would require an amendment to the Nevada Constitution and the operation of the current business court does not require an
amendment.”); Black, supra note 2, at 590 (reporting that the New York City
Bar Association believed they needed “a business court with knowledgeable
judges” to compete with Delaware but that was “politically impractical because
it required a state constitutional amendment”).
5. COMM’N ON CONN.’S LEADERSHIP IN CORP. & BUS. LAW, A REPORT TO
THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY 6 (2015) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT RE-
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware’s corporate caseload is four times that size. 6
Over the past sixteen years, the Delaware Chancery Court
has struggled to attract cases and, as a result, some believe that
Delaware’s strategy has begun to unravel.7 The unraveling reveals a potentially fatal contradiction. Delaware’s judicial strategy requires that the state attract both incorporations and litigation. But the interests of the plaintiffs’ attorneys who choose
venue for shareholder litigation are directly opposed to the interests of the managers who choose states of incorporation.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys want to maximize shareholder litigation
and the associated attorneys’ fees, while the managers want to
minimize them. 8 Delaware has only recently recognized that it
cannot appeal to both.
This Article uses systems-strategic analysis to explore the
role of Delaware’s judicial strategy in Delaware’s success and determine the consequences of that strategy’s possible failure. A
systems-strategic analysis begins by identifying a law-related
system for study, then describes how the system functions, and
finally infers what goals the system is pursuing from that function.9 Here, I analyze the system by which American corporate
law is produced, adopted, and enforced—the corporate charter
competition. Although charter competition extends to private
PORT]

(“[O]nly a quarter of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s work involves corporate disputes. The majority of its cases involve trusts and estates, probate
and guardianship matters.”).
6. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the
“Delaware Bankruptcy Court”) has approximately the same market share of
large, public-company bankruptcies—forty-nine percent—as Delaware has of
public-company incorporations—forty-eight percent. UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR.
RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2018) (one-variable study of venue (by city) for the years 2011–2016). The
Delaware Bankruptcy Court has six full-time judges. Judge’s Info, U.S. BANKR.
COURT DIST. OF DEL., http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/judges-info-0 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2018). Delaware’s population would justify only one of the six.
7. Gregory DiCiancia, Note, Limiting Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuits Via
Fee-Shifting Bylaws: A Call for Delaware To Overturn and Revise Its Fee-Shifting Bylaw Statute, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2015) (referring to “the growing
doubt surrounding [Delaware’s] future as the nation’s corporate haven”).
8. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1364
(2012) (“As a practical matter, the forum choice for representative litigation under corporate law (either a derivative suit or a class action suit) will usually be
made by the law firms acting on behalf of plaintiffs, with little or no client input.”).
9. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 479, 497–509 (1997) (explaining how to conduct a systems analysis).
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corporations and other types of entities, I have limited my analysis to the public-company context because the competition is
most pronounced in that context and nearly all of the empirical
studies necessary to conduct a systems analysis have been confined to that context. I use corporate terminology, but the analysis is equally applicable to publicly traded limited partnerships
and limited liability companies, and the statistics I have generated include them.
Three principles structure the charter competition. First, a
corporation can incorporate in any state. Second, regardless of
the state chosen, the corporation will be allowed to do business
in all states. Third, regardless of where the corporation does
business, the law of the state of incorporation governs its internal affairs. Those affairs include substantially the entire scope
of corporate law.
The system—charter competition—is composed of three
subsystems operating simultaneously. In the first, corporations
choose states of incorporation. In the second, states decide what
packages of regulation to offer. In the third, courts chosen in a
variety of ways interpret and apply the incorporation state’s law
to regulate the corporation.
My analysis concludes that the system’s principal effects are
to deregulate corporations and shield them from the democratic
reimposition of regulation. The system accomplishes the former
through a reiterative process in which corporations choose the
states that regulate them least and the states reduce their regulations to increase their appeal. A few states compete for incorporations to gain filing-fee and franchise-tax revenues from foreign corporations, but most compete as one element in a broad
effort to attract business activity by demonstrating the state’s
business friendliness.
The system’s operation is obscured by its complexity, a justifying ideology of private ordering, and deliberate obfuscation.
The structure of the charter competition insulates the law it produces from democratic control. The democratic process cannot
reach the merits of corporate-law reform in Delaware, the other
states, or at the federal level, and the structure preventing it is
difficult to see.
As a result, charter competition provides corporate managers with power and privilege at a level they could not possibly
obtain under a democratic system. Directors can sit formally
atop their organizations with little or no responsibility for what
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occurs within them.10 Delaware’s courts will not second guess
managerial decisions. 11 Directors alone decide when—if ever—
the corporation will share its wealth with shareholders. 12 As a
practical matter, shareholders or creditors cannot hold directors
and officers personally liable for their negligence, their gross
negligence, 13 or their breaches of the fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith.14 Actions for breach of managers’ fiduciary duties
to shareholders belong to the corporation, and managers have
virtually complete discretion to determine whether to bring
those actions. 15 Managers fix their own compensation.16 If the
corporation’s shares are widely held, other stakeholders can do
nothing more than protest. 17 Because managers have almost
10. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139
(Del. Ch. 2009) (failing to hold the directors of Citigroup liable for the decimation of its business that occurred on their watch during the financial crisis).
11. Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 611 (2016) (referring to corporate law’s “expansive grant of powers to the directors”); Robert B.
Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate
Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 178 (2009) (“Delaware’s model of corporate
governance, beyond the creation and naming functions described earlier, is to
provide a predictable governance structure whose central tenet is to ‘trust directors.’”).
12. Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 659 (Del. Ch. 1975)
(“Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown.”).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018) (authorizing corporations to
exculpate directors for liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care).
14. That is, the corporation can indemnify and insure managers against
that liability. Id. Sections 145(a)–(b) require a finding that the directors or officers “acted in good faith and in a manner the [directors or officers] reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation” as a
condition of indemnification. But the finding can be made by the corporation
itself or by “independent legal counsel in a written opinion” and it may not be
necessary at all if the indemnification is pursuant to section 145(f ) of the Delaware code. Id. § 145(d). Even if liability for the bad-faith actions of directors or
officers cannot be indemnified at all, the corporations can and usually do provide insurance against liability for them. Directors almost never pay anything
for their breaches of fiduciary duty. See generally Bernard Black et al., Outside
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (providing an empirical study
of how often directors pay out-of-pocket).
15. That is, managers can prevent shareholders from bringing shareholder
derivative actions by appointing independent directors to special litigation committees and, if there are no independent directors, the conflicted directors can
appoint some.
16. E.g., tit. 8, § 141(h) (“Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of
incorporation or bylaws, the board of directors shall have the authority to fix
the compensation of directors.”).
17. Federal law gives shareholders the right to a say on pay by voting to
approve or disapprove directors’ and officers’ compensation, but the vote is
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complete control over the proxy machinery 18 and the right to resist takeover attempts, 19 managers can perpetuate themselves
in office. If some group of shareholders seeks to take control of
the corporation by consolidating shareholdings, the managers
can retaliate with poison pills that selectively dilute the troublemakers’ holdings, 20 strategic speed ups 21 and delays 22 of the voting process, asset sales, lock-ups, customer assurance programs,23 the issuance of new shares with unlimited voting
rights, 24 and a variety of other antitakeover devices. 25
Despite empirical evidence to the contrary, most scholars
view the charter competition as a race to the top.26 The standard
merely advisory. SEC, Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and
Golden Parachute Compensation, 17 C.F.R §§ 229, 240, 249 (2017) (SEC Rule
14a-21a).
18. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 475, 481 (2008) (referring to “the standard state law rules that produce
reimbursement only if the insurgent wins control of the board” and citing those
rules as “providing evidence that jurisdictional competition for incorporations
is geared toward appealing to managerial interests”).
19. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at
*24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010), aff ’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010) (“[T]he board of directors is the defender of the metaphorical medieval corporate bastion and the protector of the corporation’s shareholders.” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995))).
20. E.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (validating poison pills).
21. E.g., Ala. By-Prod. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 (Del. 1991) (limiting
Schnell v. Chris–Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), which had invalidated a speed up, to “those instances that threaten the fabric of the law, or
which by an improper manipulation of the law, would deprive a person of a clear
right”).
22. E.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Del.
1998) (noting that “the combined effect of the two defensive measures would be
to delay any acquisition of Quickturn by Mentor for at least nine months”).
23. E.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Emerging Problem of Embedded Defenses: Lessons from Air Line Pilots Ass’n, International v. UAL Corp.,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1244 (2007) (“PeopleSoft initiated a ‘Customer Assurance Program’ (CAP), under which PeopleSoft customers would receive back between two and five times their money if any company acquired PeopleSoft and
then reduced the support for PeopleSoft’s software products during the first four
years of the customer ’s contract.”).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (2018) (authorizing “designation” of the
“powers” and “rights” of shares by resolution when they have not been “set forth
in the certificate of incorporation”).
25. ALAN R. PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 840–45 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing classified boards, poison pills,
share repurchases, and lock-ups).
26. E.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 770 (1995) (“[T]here is a broad consensus that
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account is that Delaware won the race by developing corporate
law expertise and striking the most efficient balance between the
rights of managers and shareholders.27 Delaware alone provided
a specialized court that could respond quickly and expertly to
corporate needs and Delaware alone was able to credibly commit
to continue serving the interests of corporations. 28 Delaware’s
lead is so great and the network effects so strong that no other
state actively competes against it. 29 If some other state adopted
a rule or practice that provided it with an advantage in the competition, Delaware could and would nullify the advantage by copying the rule or practice.30
The systems-strategic analysis I employ suggests that the
standard account should be revised in essentially five respects:
First, the charter competition is neither dormant nor merely
a competition between Delaware and the corporations’ home
states. Other states not only compete, but have attracted twentyfive percent of all public companies that have incorporated outside their home states.
Second, charter competition should be modeled not as an attempt to strike the right balance between managers and shareholders, but as a delegation of power to managers who then
strike that balance through implicit contracting. That reconceptualization leads to the insight that states do not need corporatelaw expertise to compete for incorporations.

state competition to produce corporate law is a race to (or at least toward) the
top.”).
27. E.g., CORP. LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL 11 (2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL EXPLANATION], http://www
.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL
-EXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf.
28. Delaware committed by giving the state to the corporations as a hostage. That is, Delaware increased its filing-fee and franchise-tax revenues to the
extent that the state is dependent on them. E.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 235
(1985) (“[A] state budget largely dependent on franchise revenue is an asset that
precommits the state to not welching on its corporate customers by radically
revising its corporate law policy to the detriment of their interests . . . .”). But
see Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“If the cost of re-incorporating is low, the gains
from midstream opportunism are low as well, and the hostage is superfluous.”).
29. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 748 (“The notion that states compete,
and that this competition results in a metaphorical race, is a myth.”).
30. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE
L.J. 553, 557 (2002) (asserting that “Delaware could ‘match’ by adopting the
challenger ’s improved rules”).

2108

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:2101

Third, corporate charter competition as a system is neither
a race to the top or the bottom. It is capable of generating only
one result: deregulation. What remains of corporate law is not
regulation, but mere obfuscation.
Fourth, Delaware employs a principally judicial strategy in
the competition. That strategy, which requires Delaware to attract litigation as well as incorporations, is faltering. The shift
to arbitration of shareholder litigation that is already in progress
may strip Delaware of its competitive advantage and end its
dominance.
Fifth, regardless of what happens to Delaware, for the foreseeable future charter competition will remain a highly stable
system that is effectively beyond democratic control. The only
solution to the problem of charter competition remains unthinkable: abandon the internal affairs doctrine.
This Article proceeds to those conclusions as follows. Part I
first describes and analyzes the charter-competition system. The
internal affairs doctrine provides the system’s foundation. The
system consists of three subsystems in which (1) corporations
choose incorporation states; (2) states decide what corporate law
packages to offer; and (3) courts do the actual regulating. The
analysis concludes that Delaware’s success is largely attributable to and dependent on its unique court system. Part II then
explores Delaware’s judicial strategy in more depth, argues that
Delaware has had difficulty attracting the litigation on which
the strategy depends, and describes the potentially fatal threat
from arbitration bylaws. It concludes that Delaware may be unable to prevent the loss of its shareholder litigation and the consequent failure of its judicial strategy.
Part III seeks to project the effect of a failure of Delaware’s
judicial strategy on the corporate charter competition. It concludes that the competition could melt down to an equilibrium
in which no state even purports to impose any corporate regulation and no state derives significant fees or taxes from the incorporations it attracts. It then concludes that although Delaware’s
position in the corporate charter competition is precarious, the
charter competition itself rests on a stable foundation. Regardless of what happens to Delaware, charter competition will prevent the imposition of corporate regulation for the foreseeable
future.
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I. THE SYSTEM FOR CORPORATE REGULATION
Charter competition is the system by which U.S. jurisdictions regulate corporations. The internal affairs doctrine, which
provides that the law of the incorporation state governs the corporation’s internal affairs, is the system’s foundation. That doctrine allows corporations to choose their regulators by choosing
their states of incorporation.
In this Article, I use the term corporate regulation to refer
to legal requirements that fall within the scope of the internal
affairs doctrine. 31 Requirements fall within that scope if they apply to corporations, but do not also apply to individuals. 32 They
include the traditional contents of corporation statutes, while excluding antitrust, fair trade, criminal, and other laws that apply
to a person regardless of whether the person is a corporation.33
Generally speaking, corporations prefer to be regulated by
the states that will regulate them least. Because states prefer to
be chosen, they modify their corporation laws to reduce the laws’
levels of regulation. Over more than a century, the pressure from
these choices by the corporations and the states has systematically eliminated all meaningful regulation from American corporate law.34
As shown in Figure 1, the system in which the states compete consists of three subsystems. In the first, corporations
choose states of incorporation. In the second, the states enact
and revise their corporation laws, in the process sometimes creating courts, conferring jurisdiction, and specifying who may select venue and in what circumstances. In the third, the empowered courts regulate corporations in accord with the laws of their
states of incorporation.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (defining internal affairs doctrine).
32. Id. § 302 cmt. a (making the distinction between rules that apply only
to corporations and rules that also apply to individuals).
33. Id. § 301 (“ The rights and liabilities of a corporation with respect to a
third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can likewise be done
by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are applicable to non-corporate parties.”).
34. E.g., Black, supra note 2, at 544 (“After a century of erosion through
competition for corporate charters, what is left of state corporate law is an
empty shell that has form but no content.”); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder ’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,
245 n.37 (1962) (referring to “our great empty corporate statutes—towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing
but wind”).
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Figure 1: Corporate Charter Competition

This Part first describes the role of the internal affairs doctrine, then describes the function of each of the three subsystems
separately, and ends by demonstrating the insulation of the system from democratic processes.
A. THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflicts of law rule unique
to corporate law. The rule is that the law of the state of incorporation governs the corporation’s internal affairs.35 It defines internal affairs so broadly that the doctrine extends to virtually all
of corporate law. The rule’s immediate effect is to empower
states of incorporation to make rules that apply extraterritorially. Its ultimate effect is to deregulate corporate law.
1. Externality-Generating Capacity
The internal affairs doctrine is usually described as applying only to the relationship among “the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders”36 and is often justified as part
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
36. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“ The internal affairs
doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State
should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, and shareholders.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on
Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161,
161 (1985) (describing the internal affairs doctrine as “the notion that only one
state, almost always the site of incorporation, should be authorized to regulate
the relationships among a corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders”).
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of an implied contract among those parties.37 In practice, however, courts often apply the doctrine to the corporation’s relationship with both contract 38 and tort 39 creditors. With the cooperation of the Delaware courts, managers have expanded the
doctrine strategically to also cover persons interested in buying
the corporation. The managers’ main strategy is to subject acquiring shareholders to rules that burden them without similarly burdening nonacquiring shareholders. The poison pill is a
prominent example.
The internal affairs doctrine’s impact is broader than its
scope. As Professor Jed Rubenfeld wrote, “[n]o corporate affairs
are ever exclusively ‘internal;’ they will always have consequences of greater or lesser magnitude on the ‘outside’ world.” 40
Professor Kent Greenfield provides these examples of internal
rules with external impacts: “a rule that directors should maximize profit to shareholders, or a rule that directors should not
disclose information to communities about their business practices absent a legal or financial imperative, or a rule that shareholders need not pay the debts of the corporation.” 41
Because rules that apply only internally have direct effects
on third parties, incorporation states can enact corporate-law
rules that have direct effects on third parties and apply to them
37. Elizabeth Cosenza, The Persistent Problem of Multi-Forum Shareholder
Litigation: A Proposed Statutory Response To Reshuffle the Deck, 10 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 413, 423 (2016) (“ The rationale for the internal affairs doctrine is . . .
that upon acquiring stock, shareholders ‘impliedly agree’ that the internal affairs of the company should be governed by the laws of the state of incorporation.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt To Lift the Veil of
Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L.
REV. 853, 903 (1997) (“If shareholders do not like the laws of the state of incorporation, they do not have to invest in this corporation.”).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1971) (“Matters which may also affect the interests of the corporation’s creditors include the issuance of bonds, the declaration and payment of
dividends, loans by the corporation to directors, officers and shareholders, and
the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its
own stock.”).
39. E.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation:
Why Courts Should Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General
Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 90 (2008) (“ The majority of courts apply the internal affairs doctrine to impose the law of the state
of incorporation upon piercing claims, whether those claims are based on tort
judgments or upon contract obligations.”).
40. Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause:
The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 376–77 (1988).
41. Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 135, 136–37 (2004).
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extraterritorially. For that reason, the internal affairs doctrine
is often and correctly characterized as an “externality machine.” 42
2. Losing-State Generation

The effect of the internal affairs doctrine is that each state
can regulate extraterritorially with regard to its own corporations but must yield to other states’ extraterritorial regulation of
their corporations. With respect to public-company incorporations, at least, the trade is an uneven one. Compustat 43 data on
7061 public-company incorporations show that, as compared
with a hypothetical regulatory scheme that would require companies to incorporate in their headquarters states, Delaware
gains 3879 corporations (fifty-five percent of the 7061).44 Only
four other states gain at all. Nevada gains 282 corporations (four
percent), Maryland 262 corporations (four percent), Massachusetts six corporations (0.01%), and Wyoming five corporations
(0.01%). 45 Minnesota breaks even, and the remaining forty-four
states lose corporations.46 California, home to 1210 companies
but state of incorporation for only 112, is the biggest loser. 47 One
might expect that such high concentrations of winners and losers
would cause the consensus in favor of the internal affairs doctrine to break down.

42. Id. at 140 (“ The internal affairs doctrine is easily characterized as an
externality machine.”); accord Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto, Corporate Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
551, 565 (2018) (“Joel Bakan has famously described corporations as ‘externalizing machines.’”).
43. Michael Bradley Michael, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale
L.J. 1043, 1094 n.58 (1992) (“COMPUSTAT is the most frequently used and
comprehensive data base of annual accounting numbers for large corporations.”).
44. Lynn M. LoPucki, Compustat: Table 1 Statistics (Dec. 20, 2016) (on file
with author).
45. Lynn M. LoPucki, Compustat: Incorporation Count 3 (Oct. 15, 2016) (on
file with author).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Table 1: The Biggest Winners from Corporate Charter
Competition

HeadIncorporaShop Out Shop In Gain or Loss
quarters
tions
Delaware
85
39
3918
3879
3964
Nevada
74
29
311
282
356
Maryland
258
144
406
262
520
Massachusetts
499
279
285
6
505
Wyoming
1
1
6
5
6
With respect to the states shown, the table accounts for all companies with
headquarters and jurisdiction of incorporation in the United States that were
returned on a search for companies active in 2015 in the Compustat North
America database. The total number of companies is 7061.
Jurisdiction

“Shop Out” is a firm headquartered in the jurisdiction that is incorporated elsewhere.
“Shop In” is a firm headquartered outside the jurisdiction that is incorporated
in the jurisdiction.

3. Losing-State Acquiescence
Legally, the losing states could end the charter competition
simply by rejecting the internal affairs doctrine. Although the
Delaware Supreme Court has held that the internal affairs doctrine is “mandated by ‘constitutional principles, except in the
rarest situations,’” 48 commentators overwhelmingly disagree. 49
Alternatively, the states could end the competition by imposing
conditions on foreign corporations’ access to their domestic markets. 50 They have instead chosen to allow the competition to continue. 51
48. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del 1987).
49. E.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards
a Stakeholder Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1067, 1082 (2008) (“Contrary to the claims of the Delaware Supreme
Court, the internal affairs doctrine does not have a constitutional dimension.”);
Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 357 (referring to the inference that “a state cannot
regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation (at least with respect to
shareholder voting rights) without violating the Commerce Clause” as “untenable”).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (AM. LAW INST.
1971) provides that “[s]ubject to constitutional limitations,” a state may prohibit
a foreign corporation from doing business, or conducting other activities, within
its territory or may impose conditions as the price of permitting the corporation
to do such business or such other acts.
51. E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP ACT § 15.05(c) (2007) (“ This Act does not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign
corporation authorized to transact business in this state.”).
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A powerful combination of factors explains the losing states’
acquiescence to the internal affairs doctrine. First, all fifty states
have adopted the doctrine with respect to public companies.52 A
state’s switch to any other rule would initially create conflicts
among the states and the possibility that “a corporation could be
faced with conflicting demands.” 53 Second, states may fear that
if the internal affairs doctrine becomes unsettled, the federal
government might issue charters, taking both the power to regulate corporations and the resulting filing-fee and franchise-tax
revenues for itself. 54 That change would take revenues from even
the losing states, because every state currently derives revenues
not only from incorporations, but also from foreign corporations
doing business in the state. Third, states joining in an effort to
reform corporate law may “fear retaliatory responses from
[other] states, particularly Delaware.” 55
Fourth, the losing states do not lose those revenues Delaware gains from winning. Losing states that would have taxed a
corporation’s incorporation in the state instead tax the corporation’s doing business in the state. Corporations pay more and the
losing states collect almost the same amount of money they
would if they had retained their corporations. Losing does deprive states of their ability to regulate the corporations operating
within their borders, but unilateral rejection of the internal affairs doctrine would be a dangerous way to attempt to solve that
problem. Corporations might respond to the first states to reject
the doctrine by moving their operations out of the state. Rejection of the internal affairs doctrine would, in any event, certainly
52. California and New York have partially rejected the internal affairs
doctrine, but not with respect to public companies. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c)
(2010) (“This section does not apply to any corporation . . . with outstanding securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the NYSE Amex, the NASDAQ
Global Market, or the NASDAQ Capital Market . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 1317 (McKinney 2003) (laying out the liability of foreign directors under New
York corporate law); id. § 1320(a)(1) (“[A] foreign corporation . . . shall be exempt
from the provisions of . . . subparagraph (a)(1) of section 1317 . . . if . . . [s]hares
of such corporation were listed on a national securities exchange . . . .”).
53. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
54. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 636 (2003)
(“[States] know that a crisis will attract federal attention and that their corporate law authority might be sapped if it does.”); Lipton, supra note 11, at 641
(concluding that “the displacement of state control [of corporate litigation by
arbitration] might pave the way for more intrusive, and substantive, federal
regulation”).
55. Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1499
(2002).
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complicate a state’s efforts to portray itself as business-friendly.
Lastly, the beneficiaries of the internal affairs doctrine are the
corporations physically located in the losing states. Rejection of
the doctrine would deprive them of the freedom to choose their
regulators. They might retaliate politically against the elected
officials responsible for their loss of that freedom.
Together, these factors render the internal affairs doctrine
virtually immutable. The losing states are not so much victims
of the internal affairs doctrine as coconspirators keeping it in
place. The doctrine enables states to import what amounts to a
regulatory void in corporate law, 56 without having to accept political responsibility for doing so. As a result, the internal affairs
doctrine remains firmly entrenched and provides a stable platform for the expansion of unregulated corporate power.
B. CORPORATE CHOICE OF INCORPORATION STATE
Even charter-competition skeptics agree that public companies shop for their states of incorporation. 57 Choosing a state
makes that state the corporation’s exclusive corporate regulator.
Every corporation chooses a state of incorporation at its inception and can change its state of incorporation at any time by any
of several simple and inexpensive methods of reincorporation.
Both public and private corporations shop for incorporation
states. To illustrate, tiny Delaware is the incorporation state for
1.2 million private entities—nearly as many as the approximately 1.5 million incorporated in California.58 This Article focuses, however, on the motives and choices of public companies.
Seventy-four percent of public companies are incorporated
in a state other than the state in which they are headquartered.59 If the advantages were sufficiently great, some portion
of the remaining twenty-six percent would undoubtedly also be
willing to incorporate elsewhere.

56. See sources cited supra note 34.
57. E.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 735 (“[ F ]irm choice, rather than
state competition, is therefore the proper paradigm to analyze corporate law.”).
58. About Agency, STATE OF DEL.: DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp.delaware
.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“More than [one million]
business entities have made Delaware their legal home.”); Public Records Act
request from Lynn M. LoPucki to California Secretary of State, Aug. 2, 2013 (on
file with the author).
59. Infra Table 2.
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1. Who Decides?
Managers, not shareholders, choose the incorporation
state. 60 In an initial public offering, corporate insiders make the
choice before they approach the underwriters.61 The underwriters present the managers’ choice to the prospective shareholders
as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. In the context of the overall
investment opportunity, state of incorporation is not a salient
term and will be overlooked. 62 Because all states offer essentially
the same corporate law,63 the choice among the states matters
to a rational investor in only the rarest of circumstances. Thus
scholars who model choice of incorporation state as a bargain between managers and shareholders are modeling a theoretical
choice, not a choice in which shareholders are actually participating.
Managers also decide whether the corporation should later
change its state of incorporation. 64 Corporations generally seek
reincorporation after periods of abnormal positive returns to

60. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 592 (“Under prevailing law,
management has veto power over reincorporations.”); Renee M. Jones, Does
Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 896 (2006) (“[M]anagers choose the state of incorporation.”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977) (“[T]he decision as
to which state to incorporate in is in almost all cases a managerial decision.”).
61. Underwriter influence is apparently minimal. William J. Carney et al.,
Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate Law, 2 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 123, 134 n.48 (2012) (“[W]e found that the jurisdiction had already
been chosen for the IPO by the time the matter reached the underwriter (81%
of the time).”).
62. Allen, supra note 3, at 793 (“Companies that are going public often include provisions, such as classified boards and dual class common stock, which
are not “stockholder friendly,” in their organizational documents. Eager investors often overlook such provisions.”).
63. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2000) (“[V]ariations
in state corporation laws are minimal.”); Romano, supra note 28, at 278 (finding
in a survey of corporations that “the top 200 non-Delaware firms did not perceive the corporation laws of their state of incorporation to differ much from
Delaware’s code”); Winter, supra note 60, at 255 (“[T]he Delaware Code is no
longer significantly different from those of a number of other states.”).
64. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1435, 1460 (1992) (“[M]anagers . . . have considerable influence over reincorporation decisions.”); id. at 1475 (“[N]otwithstanding the requirement of
shareholder approval, Delaware and other states have significant room (and incentives) to adopt value-decreasing rules for the governance of certain corporate
law issues.”).
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shareholders. 65 In theory, shareholders could refuse to approve
the managers’ choice, but such refusals are rare. 66 While some
older studies suggested a generally positive market reaction to
reincorporation to Delaware, 67 a more recent study using a better methodology shows a negative, but statistically insignificant,
market reaction to reincorporation in Delaware.68 Shareholders’
indifference to reincorporation in Delaware leaves managers
free to do it.
2. What Is the Basis for Choice?

A substantial literature reports the bases on which corporations choose their states of incorporation. These include the cost
of incorporation in the state; particular features of the state’s
substantive law; the quality of the state’s courts; the preferences
of the corporation’s professional advisors; the perceived political
responsiveness of the state; the state’s reputation; and the familiarity of the managers and investors with the state’s corporatelaw package.
a. Direct Costs
Although Delaware is by far the most expensive state in
which a large public company can incorporate, the direct costs of
incorporation are sufficiently small that they are unlikely to affect many companies’ decisions. 69 To be incorporated in a state,
a corporation pays an initial incorporation fee, an annual renewal fee, and, in some states, an annual franchise tax. In most
states, the annual fees and taxes for even a large public company

65. Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
“Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 281 (1980)
(finding that “over the [two] years preceding the month of the switch, stockholders earn positive abnormal returns”).
66. But see Dave Ebersole, Reforming Ohio Corporate Law and Securities
Regulation To Facilitate Investment in Ohio, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J.
451, 451–56 (2012) (describing shareholder rejection of Abercrombie & Fitch
Co.’s attempt to reincorporate from Delaware to Ohio).
67. Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C.
L. REV. 1049, 1058–59 (2016).
68. Id. at 1052 (“We show that Delaware law does not add to or subtract
significant value from publicly traded companies.”).
69. Bebchuk and Cohen argue that “the extra costs of going out of state”
are “likely to be trivial for firms that are very large.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where To Incorporate, 46 J. LAW & ECON. 383,
398 (2003).
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are only a few hundred dollars. 70 In Delaware, they reach
$250,000 annually for the largest companies. 71
To do business in each state other than its state of incorporation, a corporation also pays qualification fees, renewal fees,
and, in some states, an annual franchise tax. With only a few
exceptions, the fees for doing business in a state approximately
equal the fees for incorporating and renewing in the state.72 The
result is that incorporation in a state where the corporation does
not do business adds the cost of the incorporation state to the
corporation’s total costs, but incorporation in a state where the
corporation does do business probably does not increase the corporation’s total costs at all.
To change its incorporation state after the initial selection,
the corporation must also pay legal fees, additional state filing
fees, and perhaps the costs of printing and distributing proxy
statements. 73 In 1985, Romano estimated the typical reincorporation cost for a public company at $40,000 74 and noted the highest reincorporation cost estimate in her survey was $1.1 million. 75 Black estimated typical reincorporation costs at $40,000
to $80,000 in 1990. 76 These costs of reincorporation do not appear to be high enough to affect corporate decision making.
b. Substantive Law
The crux of the charter competition debate has been
whether managers choose incorporation states to benefit themselves (race to the bottom) or to benefit both themselves and
shareholders in some efficient combination (race to the top). But
the literature identifies only a single difference in corporate law
that clearly causes corporations to choose one state over another.

70. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 690 tbl.1, 692 tbl.2 (showing amounts
by state).
71. Annual Report and Tax Information, STATE OF DEL.: DIV. OF CORPS.,
https://corp.delaware.gov/frtax.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
72. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., CALIFORNIA’S CORPORATION TAXES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2003), https://ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1083.pdf
(explaining corporations doing business in California pay the minimum franchise tax).
73. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 28, at 246 (discussing reincorporation
costs).
74. Id. Adjusted for inflation, that is about $88,110 in 2015 dollars.
75. Id. at 249.
76. Black, supra note 2, at 558 (estimating the cost of public company reincorporation at $40,000 to $80,000).
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That difference is between laws that protect managers
against takeovers and laws that do not. Professor Guhan Subramanian showed that “managers migrate to (and fail to migrate
away from)” 77 three types of antitakeover statutes: (1) control
share acquisition statutes; (2) business combination statutes;
and (3) pill validation statutes. Subramanian characterized his
finding as “generally consistent with the explicit prediction of
race-to-the-bottom theorists and inconsistent with the explicit
prediction of race-to-the-top theorists.” 78 Similarly, Professors
Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen found that corporations are
more likely to choose Delaware when their home states provide
managers with fewer protections against takeovers. 79
In a separate article, Bebchuk reasoned that a race to the
bottom would occur with respect to rules related to managers’
ability to “significantly redistribute” wealth from the corporation
to themselves. 80 He identified the rules governing managerial
self-dealing, the taking of corporate opportunities, and insider
trading 81 as likely to produce races to the bottom. He also predicted a race to the bottom in rules governing “the regulation of
takeovers and proxy contests, the protection of creditors, disclosure regulation, and the protection of constituencies other than
providers of capital” because those rules could create significant
externalities.82 With respect to insignificantly redistributive
rules, Bebchuk reasoned that the race would be to the top,83 but
he did not identify specific rules.
Contrary to Subramanian, Bebchuk, and Cohen, Professor
Robert Daines found that “[p]oison pill or control share statutes
make it more likely that firms will leave a state and incorporate
in Delaware,” but he cautioned that “this effect is not robust and
is theoretically questionable given the ease with which firms can
77. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1838 (2002).
78. Id. at 1848.
79. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 387 (“[S]tates with no anti[-]takeover statutes, such as California, do poorly and retain a relatively small fraction
of the companies located in them. . . . [S]tates that amass most or all standard
antitakeover statutes are the most successful both in retaining in-state firms
and in attracting out-of-state firms.”).
80. Bebchuk, supra note 64, at 1460.
81. Id. at 1462.
82. Id. at 1494.
83. Id. at 1462 (“[M]arket discipline will probably discourage managers
from seeking inefficient rules with respect to insignificantly redistributive issues.”).
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opt into or out of these provisions.” 84 He should also have noted
that Delaware has case law validating poison pills, so it is far
from clear how a poison-pill statute in the home state could be
driving reincorporations to Delaware. 85
c. Courts

Numerous sources stress the importance of the Delaware
court system to corporations’ decisions to incorporate in Delaware. 86 At least twenty-two states have created business courts
of some nature, 87 and some have done so in the hope of competing with Delaware for incorporations.88 But Delaware retains
several clear advantages.
In Delaware, the five-judge Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over corporate matters, and appeals are directly to the fivejustice Supreme Court. The Delaware system is unique in at
least three important respects. First, Delaware’s Chancery
84. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1597 (2002) (emphasis added).
85. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on
the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087,
1089 (2012) (noting that since 1985 “Delaware judges have struck down some
new variations of the poison pill as entrenchment mechanisms, but generally,
they have approved traditional rights plans as useful bargaining devices for
well-intentioned boards of directors”).
86. E.g., LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 5
(2007), https://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (“Many experienced
lawyers believe that the principal reason to recommend to their clients that they
incorporate in Delaware is the Delaware courts and the body of case law those
courts have developed.”); Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“My explanation [for Delaware’s prominence] depends primarily on Delaware’s expert judges.”); John F.
Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1983 (2012) (“[Business] courts can attract—and have attracted—
litigation business to the jurisdiction that creates them . . . .”); Romano, supra
note 28, at 277 (“[T]he product Delaware offers is not simply particular statutes,
but also their interpretation by courts.”); Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s
Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 221 (2015) (“Delaware’s key contribution to
U.S. corporate governance is the production of substantially judge-made corporate law . . . .”).
87. Lee Applebaum, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN
STATE COURTS: THE STEADY GROWTH OF BUSINESS COURTS 70 (2011), http://
www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/Author%20PDFs/
Applebaum.ashx (“ These ‘business courts’ assign specialist judges to manage
and decide commercial and business cases and have increased from three pilot
dockets in 1993 to over 40 court programs within 22 states in 2010.”); see Coyle,
supra note 86, at 1918 (“Over the past twenty years, specialized trial courts with
dockets comprised primarily or exclusively of business cases—commonly known
as business courts—have been established in nineteen states in the United
States.”).
88. See supra note 4; see also Coyle, supra note 86.
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Court is probably the only specialized business court authorized
to operate without juries. 89 Second, the court has a long tradition
of publishing its opinions in West Reporters and on Westlaw and
Lexis, which has created a large body of precedent. 90 By contrast,
the business courts of most competing states have only recently
begun publishing their opinions on websites and some do not
publish them at all. 91 Third, although the Delaware Chancery
Court has a substantial noncorporate caseload, that court’s corporate law caseload has been sufficiently large and concentrated
that Delaware’s judges have been able to develop considerable
corporate-law expertise.
d. Legal Advice

The knowledge and beliefs of legal advisors play an important role in corporations’ choice of incorporation state. In a
study of initial public offerings, Daines found that whether the
corporation’s law firm had “clients in many states” was more important in choosing between the company’s home state and Delaware than any other variable he tested. 92 National law firms
tended to recommend Delaware incorporation, while law firms
with clients in only one state tended to recommend home-state
incorporation.93 In a survey of lawyers and underwriters, Carney
et al. found that underwriters’ and issuers’ lawyers overwhelmingly recommended “incorporation of public corporations in Delaware regardless of the corporation’s location.” 94 The lawyers’
familiarity with Delaware law was an important factor. Seventyfive percent of underwriters’ lawyers and fifty-five percent of issuers’ lawyers agreed with the statement “I don’t recommend incorporation in states other than Delaware or my state because I

89. Supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Kahan & Kamar, supra
note 1, at 711 (showing eight business courts that offer trial by jury).
90. Daines, supra note 84, at 1583 (“Other states, lacking Delaware’s established precedent, unique case flow, and specialized courts, are likely less able
to develop a distinctive and predictable body of case law.”).
91. Coyle, supra note 86, at 1957–58 (providing a table showing that twelve
of seventeen business courts publish opinions on the courts’ websites).
92. Daines, supra note 84, at 1595.
93. Id. (“[L]ocal lawyers advise firms to incorporate locally, while national
lawyers advise firms to incorporate in Delaware.”). Daines does not indicate how
he determined which firms had “clients in many states.”
94. Carney et al., supra note 61, at 140 (reporting that for underwriters’
lawyers, the proportion was ninety-seven percent; for issuers’ lawyers the proportion was eighty-three percent).
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am relatively unfamiliar with the details of the laws and courts
of these other states.” 95
e. Political Responsiveness

Some scholars assert that corporations favor their home
state because the corporations can more easily influence their
home state’s legislature in seeking changes to corporate law. 96
For example, Bebchuk and Cohen state:
[A] firm located in a state—especially a large firm located in a small
state—might hope that its stature and clout in the state would lead
judges or public officials to give it favorable treatment with respect to
some corporate law issues that might arise. Similarly, a firm located in
a state might expect that, if it displays “loyal citizenship” by incorporating in the state, it would increase its chances of getting favorable
treatment from public officials on issues unrelated to corporate law
that might arise in the firm’s dealings with the state. 97

Bebchuk and Cohen also found that “states that have a heavily
Democratic electorate, and thus are more likely to have activist
judges, are less successful in attracting firms.”98
f.

Other Attractors

Several scholars have recently proposed that corporations
choose Delaware for other features that have no specific locus in
Delaware’s laws, courts, or administrative procedures. Omari
Scott Simmons proposes that attraction to Delaware is largely
explained by Delaware’s brand, which includes “reputation, visibility to top management, time-in-business, customer lists, competitors, academic curriculum, and discursive debate.” 99 Michael
Klausner proposes that charters have network effects that enhance their value when large numbers of corporations adopt
them. 100 William J. Carney et al. found in a survey of underwriters’ and issuers’ attorneys that corporations chose Delaware “be-

95. Id. at 143.
96. Daines, supra note 84, at 1578 (“ The most plausible benefit from local
incorporation is that it allows managers to influence the firm’s corporate law
rules by lobbying the legislature for particular corporate law reforms.”).
97. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 398–99.
98. Id. at 421.
99. Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139 (2008).
100. Klausner, supra note 26 (discussing the effects of corporate contracts
and associated network externalities).
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cause they believe that investors who might purchase the company’s securities are familiar only with Delaware law.” 101 Finally, Brian Broughman et al. provide evidence that because
most attorneys are fluent in home-state law and Delaware law,
“a firm raising financing from in-state and out-of-state investors
will choose Delaware to provide in-state and out-of-state investors a legal language that all can speak.”102 Because each of
these factors can operate independently of Delaware’s law,
courts, or administrators, none depends on assumptions about
Delaware’s superiority.
In summary, corporations choose states through a diffuse
process in which reputation and familiarity dominate, providing
Delaware with a strong advantage. Delaware’s only tangible advantage is its judicial system. Protection of managers against
takeover is the only substantive law issue that clearly matters.
Both takeover protection and the direct costs of incorporation
weigh against Delaware to the extent they matter at all.
C. STATE CHOICE OF CORPORATE LAW PACKAGE
In the second subsystem of the system for corporate regulation, states decide what corporate-law packages to offer. Because
managers choose the incorporation state, states tend to compete
to offer the packages most attractive to managers. 103 The packages consist of four elements: (1) a corporation statute; (2) a
method for legislative amendment; (3) a court system that includes judges, attorneys, and precedent; and (4) a state agency
that maintains corporate records. 104 The state determines what
101. Carney et al., supra note 61, at 137 (“92% of underwriters’ lawyers and
83% of issuers’ lawyers agreed that ‘Delaware is a better place than my state to
incorporate for public companies because investors are more familiar with Delaware law.’”).
102. Brian Broughman et al., Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and
Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 893 (2014).
103. E.g., COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 375 (Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds., 2013) (empirical finding that “the [United
States] tends to favour directors more often than other countries”); William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 621 (2006) (“Externalities do occur because
Delaware’s strategy structurally favors management on allocational questions.”); Glynn, supra note 49, at 1069 (“Because managers will select the law
that favors their interests, states competing for corporate charters (most notably Delaware) craft corporate legal norms to appeal to managers, not to all firm
stakeholders.”).
104. In a pamphlet printed and distributed by the Delaware Department of
State, Black describes the “source of Delaware’s prestige—even cachet” as including:
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actions may be brought and, within limits discussed below, what
courts may adjudicate them.
1. Modeling State Competition
Three models compete to explain the states’ choices of what
packages to offer. In the competition model, substantially all
states compete to attract all incorporations. In the defensivecompetition model, Delaware competes for all incorporations
while the other states compete only for the incorporations of corporations headquartered within their borders. In the no-competition model, no state competes because Delaware has already
won. My data suggest that the competition model best describes
the operation of this subsystem.
a. The No-Competition Model
Professors Kahan and Kamar, the leading proponents of the
no-competition model, claim that corporate charter competition
is a myth. 105 They acknowledge that states are changing their
corporation codes in ways that make the codes more attractive
to corporations, but argue that the increasing attractiveness is
merely an “incidental effect.” 106 “No state other than Delaware,”
they say, “is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies.” 107 Other leading scholars agree. 108
the Delaware General Corporation Law which is one of the most advanced and flexible corporation statutes in the nation. It includes the
Delaware courts and, in particular, Delaware’s highly respected corporations court, the Court of Chancery. It includes the state legislature
which takes seriously its role in keeping the corporation statute and
other business laws current. It includes the Secretary of State’s Office
which thinks and acts more like one of the corporations it administers
than a government bureaucracy.
BLACK, supra note 86, at 1. See Klausner, supra note 26, at 843 (“A state’s charter is a large package of contract terms, which includes the state’s substantive
and procedural laws, the right to use the state’s judiciary to resolve disputes,
and access to its bar for legal advice and representation.”).
105. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 684 (“ The thesis of this Article is that
the very notion that states compete for incorporations is a myth. Other than
Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of
public companies.”).
106. Id. at 701 (“Of course, states occasionally take actions, such as revising
their corporation codes, that have the incidental effect of making them more
attractive as corporate domiciles.”).
107. Id. at 723 n.154.
108. E.g., Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“Rational legislators in other states
will presumably realize the futility of competing with Delaware.”); Daines, supra note 84, at 1600 (“ There is simply no meaningful actual competition for
national firms outside of Delaware.”); Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law
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The essence of Kahan and Kamar’s argument is that states
other than Delaware are charging such low fees and taxes that
they cannot derive significant revenues from incorporations. Because the states cannot derive significant revenues from competition, Kahan and Kamar conclude that competition cannot be
occurring.109
Kahan and Kamar misperceive the competition in three respects. First, the competition is not merely a competition for fees
and taxes. It is a competition to attract investment to the state
by appearing business friendly. To accomplish that, states strategically conflate the attraction of businesses with the attraction
of incorporations. 110
Second, Kahan and Kamar disregarded competitive efforts
that they considered to be unsuccessful. Delaware has actual

Too Big To Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 77 (2008) (stating that “no other state
actively seeks the incorporation business,” that “Delaware is alone in the rechartering market” and the “few states that tried to compete on one level or
another have stopped doing so”).
109. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 748 (“Even if they attracted a substantial number of public corporations, they would neither earn meaningful additional franchises taxes under their current tax structures nor profit significantly from an increase in legal business. Accordingly, they do preciously little
to attract incorporations.”).
110. LEGISLATIVE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 71ST SESSION OF THE NEVADA
LEGISLATURE BY THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION’S SUBCOMMITTEE TO ENCOURAGE CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT BUSINESS IN THIS STATE 4 (2000), https://perma.cc/WS7B-UUQA (referring to “18 recommendations designed to promote business incorporation and
retention and economic development and diversification in Nevada”); N.C.
COMM’N ON BUS. LAWS & ECON. ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1995) (“ There is no reason
why the legal environment of North Carolina should not be as attractive to business as its physical environment (thereby inducing out-of-state corporations to
incorporate here) so long as changes in that environment can be made without
adversely affecting other constituencies within the state.”); CT Seeks To Challenge Delaware’s Business-Friendly Legal Environment, HARTFORD BUSINESS.COM (June 9, 2014), http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20140609/
PRINTEDITION/306069911/ct-seeks-to-challenge-delaware (discussing Connecticut’s “10-year plan to challenge and eventually overtake Delaware as the
leading state in the country for businesses and corporations to locate, incorporate and do business”).
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competitors. At present, Nevada, 111 Maryland, 112 Oklahoma, 113
Connecticut, 114 North Dakota, 115 South Dakota, 116 and Wyoming 117 are either actively competing or preparing to do so. Kahan and Kamar discussed Nevada and Maryland’s efforts to
compete for incorporations, but dismissed Nevada’s efforts as directed mainly at nonpublic companies, Maryland’s as directed at
111. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 940 (2012) (“Nevada has capitalized
on this opportunity by offering, and aggressively marketing, a unique product—
a no-liability corporate law—that has proven attractive to a subset of American
companies.”).
112. Jay C. Hartzell et al., The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public
Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 51 J.L. & ECON. 539,
545–46 (2008) (finding that sixty-eight percent of real estate investment trusts
making initial public offerings chose to incorporate in Maryland). Maryland has
modified its Corporations and Associations Code to accommodate real estate investment trusts; forty-four provisions expressly refer to them. MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 1-101 to 12-1006 (West 2017). The corresponding number
for California’s Corporations code is sixteen. Only four provisions of Delaware’s
General Corporation Law chapter of title 8 (Corporations), and twelve provisions of title 6 (Commerce and Trade), expressly refer to real-estate investment
trusts.
113. Oklahoma adopted the Delaware General Corporation Law in 1986. After the ATP Tour decision in 2014, Oklahoma amended its corporation law to
provide that “[i]n any derivative action instituted by a shareholder of a domestic
or foreign corporation, the court . . . upon final judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party or parties the reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees . . . incurred as a result of such action.” OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1126(c) (West 2014); see ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis
Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
114. CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, exhibit 1 (showing chart comparing Connecticut and Delaware corporation laws “with the purpose of . . . recommending ways to attract and retain Connecticut businesses”).
115. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporations Act Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2008) (stating that
North Dakota’s “idea” is to “attract incorporations away from Delaware by being
more shareholder-friendly than Delaware”).
116. Seth Tupper, Look Out, Delaware: Here Comes South Dakota, RAPID
CITY J. (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/look-out
-delaware-here-comes-south-dakota/article_f4625607-8bf6-517b-8c7a
-0ea0397022a8.html (describing the newly elected South Dakota Secretary of
State as “a Republican who campaigned on making South Dakota a haven for
business incorporation [who] plans to dedicate a staff member to it and other
special projects”).
117. Kevin G. Hall & Marisa Taylor, US Scolds Others About Offshores, but
Looks the Other Way at Home, MCCLATCHY DC (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www
.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article70008302.html (describing Wyoming’s aggressive competition for anonymous incorporation). Although
I could find no evidence that Wyoming competes for public company incorporations, it is one of only five states that attracts more than it loses. See supra
Table 1.
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only investment companies, and both as not sufficiently successful. 118 In essence, they define Delaware’s competitors out of existence.
Third, Kahan and Kamar implicitly assume that competition cannot exist without at least two active competitors. But
other scholars have noted that charter competition will prevent
corporate regulation even if Delaware is the only competitor. 119
That is, if Delaware were the only competitor, Delaware’s strategy should be to continue to make its corporation law more attractive to managers in order to further increase its market
share and to fend off potential competitors who could enter at
any time. Thus, so long as the internal affairs doctrine is in effect, corporate law will continue to evolve toward serving the interests of the managers who choose the state of incorporation.
b. The Defensive Competition Model
Most scholars adhere to a model in which Delaware competes to attract corporations and the corporations’ home states
compete to retain corporations by changing their corporation
laws defensively. The states’ motive for defensive competition
cannot be filing fees and franchise taxes. If a corporation reincorporates to Delaware, Delaware gets filing fees and franchise
taxes that would otherwise have gone to the home state, but the
home state receives an equal amount of revenues from the newly
foreign corporation’s registration to do business in the home
state. More plausible explanations presented by the literature
for defensive competition are, first, that local corporate interests
lobby for their states to compete 120 and, second, that home states
compete in order to benefit local lawyers who seek to retain the
corporations as clients.121
118. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 716–22.
119. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory
Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 676 (1997) (claiming that “only one
state, Delaware, competes for charters on a national basis”).
120. Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s VantagePoint: The Empire Strikes Back
in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (2008) (“Although it
is true that other state legislatures generally have followed Delaware’s lead on
corporate law matters . . . this may be more attributable to successful local interest group lobbying than to a strategic attempt to attract out-of-state incorporations.”).
121. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214 (2006)
(“ The modus operandi for the states’ activity is most typically corporate lawyers
acting in their self-interest and not government officials.”).
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Scholars’ belief that charter competition is merely between
Delaware and the home states 122 is based on a series of studies
of initial public offerings. Those studies report proportions of incorporation in states other than Delaware or the home state as
ranging from three to seven percent 123—levels the scholars regard as de minimis. But nineteen percent of all public companies
are now incorporated in states other than Delaware or the home
state. 124 A comparison of my 2015 statistics to Professor Subramanian’s 2000 statistics shows that home-state incorporations
have declined sharply, while Delaware and other-state incorporations have both increased moderately. 125 I conclude that charter competition is not merely between Delaware and the corporations’ home states.
c. The Competition Model
As shown in Table 2, nineteen percent of public companies
are incorporated in a state other than Delaware or the company’s
home state. The competition model is the only one that can account for these companies.

122. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 420 (“ The choice is thus not among
a multitude of competitors for the national market but rather between incorporating in the home state or in Delaware.”); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30,
at 575 (“[ F ]irms in each local market are currently making a choice that is effectively between incorporating in their home state or in Delaware.”); Fisch, supra note 63, at 1062 (“Corporations choose between incorporating in their home
state and incorporating in Delaware. Virtually no corporation chooses any other
alternative.”).
123. Broughman et al., supra note 102, at 872 (“Only 3.5 percent of sample
firms choose to incorporate in a jurisdiction other than Delaware or their home
state.”); Carney et al., supra note 61, at 147 (“In 93% of the IPOs, incorporation
was in either Delaware or the home state.”); Daines, supra note 84, at 1562 (“In
spite of all the debate about firms’ freedom to incorporate anywhere, the importance of corporate law, and spirited state competition for charters, firms’ actual choices are much more mundane: 97% of public firms incorporate either in
their home state or Delaware.”).
124. Infra Table 2.
125. In a study of all public company incorporations using 2000 Compustat
data, Subramanian found “that 15% of [public] companies are incorporated neither in their home state nor in Delaware[,]” noting that “this statistic is somewhat at odds with the conventional view . . . that managers consider the charter
decision to be between their headquarters state and Delaware.” Subramanian,
supra note 77, at 1816.

2018]

CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION

2129

Table 2: Trend in Public Company Place
of Incorporation
Year
Incorporation state

2000

2015

Home state other than Delaware

2737
(35%)

1814
(26%)

Delaware

3910
(50%)

3918
(55%)

Neither Delaware nor home
state

1173
(15%)

1329
(19%)

7820
(100%)

7061
(100%)

Total

The 2000 data are from Subramanian.
The 2015 data are from LoPucki.

Delaware’s small size confers an advantage. As other scholars have noted, small states are better suited to offensive competition than large ones. 126 The monetary prize for winning at
the level that Delaware has is approximately one billion dollars
a year. 127 That is twenty-five percent of Delaware’s four billion

126. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 131
(2009) (“Only smaller states are potential competitors, and they are few enough
that internal politics could stymie each of them from emerging as effective ongoing competitors.”). To illustrate, the populations and population rankings of
the four states most actively engaged in charter competition are Wyoming
(579,000, rank 50); North Dakota (755,000, rank 46); Delaware (962,000, rank
44); and Nevada (3 million, rank 32). State Population Totals and Components
of Change: 2010–2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www
.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/state-total.html. The most active foreign competitors are small island countries, including the Cayman Islands
(62,348), Bermuda (61,070), Mauritius (1,268,315), and the Seychelles (95,235).
Countries in the World by Population (2018), WORLDOMETERS, http://www
.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country (last visited Apr.
14, 2018).
127. DEFAC GENERAL FUND REVENUE WORKSHEET 1 (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/defac/09_17/revenues.pdf (showing net
franchise plus LP and LLC fees actually collected in fiscal year 2017 as $986.9
million).
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dollar annual budget, 128 and so well worth Delaware’s competitive effort. But it is only one-half of one percent of California’s
$190 billion budget. 129
The benefits from small size do not, however, preclude
larger competitors. In one respect, large states have greater incentives than small states to compete defensively. Large states
are home to large numbers of public companies that pay fees and
franchise taxes to Delaware. By matching Delaware’s benefits, a
large state can relieve a large number of local companies from
having to pay Delaware’s high cost of incorporation. 130
Nor does Delaware’s commitment preclude competition.
Scholars differ over whether states must evidence a long-term
commitment to attract incorporations. Some attribute Delaware’s success to such a commitment. They argue that the state’s
dependence on incorporation revenues makes Delaware effectively a corporate hostage, assuring the state’s future behavior. 131 Others have argued, however, that long-term commitment
is unnecessary because reincorporation costs are low. A corporation can leave if and when its incorporation state becomes inhospitable.132
Corporate charter competition is alive and well, and Delaware’s continued dominance is not inevitable. The competition
model is the one that best describes the success of Nevada, Maryland, and Massachusetts shown in Table 1 and the dispersion
of formerly home-state incorporations show in Table 2.

128. STATE OF DEL., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, FISCAL YEAR 2016 OPERATCAPITAL BUDGET SUMMARY 8 (2016), https://budget.delaware.gov/
budget/fy2016/documents/budget-summary.pdf (estimating a general fund operating budget of $3,908.5 million for fiscal year 2016).
129. See Brandon Martin, California’s State Budget: The Governor ’s Proposal, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 1 (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.ppic.org/wp-content/
uploads/JTF_Budget0118JTF.pdf (reporting California’s proposed 2018–2019
budget as $190.3 billion).
130. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware
Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (describing the process
used by Georgia to match its corporate laws to those deployed in Delaware).
131. Romano, supra note 28, at 240 (referring to the “hostage theory of the
states’ conduct in the charter market”).
132. Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“If the cost of re-incorporating is low, the
gains from midstream opportunism are low as well, and the hostage is superfluous.”).
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2. The Corporate-Law Production Subsystems
Each state assembles and offers a corporate-law package
consisting of a corporation law, a method for amending it, a judicial system, and an administrative agency. The statutes and
agencies are similar across states. Delaware, as previously
noted, provides a court system more highly specialized in corporate law than other states can offer. This Section addresses the
differences in amendment methods, which have important effects on speed and responsiveness.
States change their corporate-law packages by enacting
laws. The formal process is the same as that for changing other
laws of the state. But two relevant informal differences exist.
First, thirty-two states have adopted some version of the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) 133 and even some nonMBCA-adopting states have adopted particular provisions of the
MBCA. 134 In essence, those states have outsourced the production of their corporate law and, to some degree, surrendered control over it.
In substance, the MBCA is similar to the Delaware law, 135
and the MBCA’s adopters include both states that actively compete for charters and states that do not.136 The drafters of the
133. The Model Act today is the general corporation statute for thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia, and is the source of many provisions in the
general corporation statutes of other states. 2016 Revision to Model Business
Corporation Act Makes Its Debut, BUS. L. TODAY (Dec. 2016), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2016/12/mbca-201612
.authcheckdam.pdf. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (CORP. LAWS COMM.,
revised 2016).
134. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT; Jeffrey Beck with Zachary Redman, Nevada:
Delaware of the West?, DEAL LAWS., Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 1 (“In 1991 and 1995,
for example, the Nevada Legislature revamped its mergers and consolidations
law through the enactment of provisions derived or adapted from the Model
Business Corporation Act . . . to incorporate uniform procedures for mergers,
equity exchanges, and conversions.”).
135. See, e.g., R. Franklin Balotti & Megan W. Shaner, Safe Harbor for Officer Reliance: Comparing the Approaches of the Model Business Corporation Act
and Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 173
(2011) (“Under both the MBCA and Delaware law, directors and officers owe
essentially the same fiduciary duties to a corporation and its stockholders.”);
Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L.
99, 129 (2004) (“ The MBCA is generally similar to Delaware law, with some
fairly notable differences.”).
136. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (recommending that
Connecticut continue to pattern its corporate laws after the MBCA); id. at 1–20
(discussing Connecticut’s desire to supplant Delaware as the leading venue in
which to incorporate). Wyoming and South Dakota are also MBCA-adopters
that compete for charters. See State Corporation Laws, U.S. LEGAL, https://
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MBCA and Delaware statutes seem to share the same pro-private-ordering philosophy. Both pride themselves on receiving
outside input 137 and copy each other’s work. 138 As a result, the
laws are probably about equally attractive.
The principal difference is that the MBCA drafters tend to
adopt bright-line rules, including MBCA rules regarding fiduciary duties, while the Delaware drafters prefer vagueness and indeterminacy. 139 The difference in judicial capabilities seems to
be driving that difference in drafting policy. Because Delaware
has specialized courts, it can deliver flexible law that its courts
adjust at the time they apply it. Because the MBCA states lack
specialized corporate courts, they must spell out the rules in
their statutes. 140
The second informal difference is that Delaware’s in-state
drafting process enables Delaware to act more quickly and respond more directly to competitive considerations. 141 The de
facto drafter of the MBCA is the twenty-four member Corporate
Laws Committee of the American Bar Association’s Business
Law Section (the “Committee”); 142 the de facto drafter of the Delaware statute is the twenty-two member Council of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association (the

corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/state-corporation-laws (last
visited Apr. 14, 2018).
137. Jeffrey M. Gorris et al., Delaware Corporate Law and the Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107,
116 (Winter 2011) (“ The Council, similar to the Committee on Corporate Laws,
receives input from a national constituency about areas for statutory improvement.”).
138. Id. at 107 (stating that the “central point of this article is that there has
been a constructive symbiosis” between the MBCA and Delaware law).
139. Id. at 116 (referring to “MBCA’s propensity to build bright-line rules
into the statute in an attempt to create greater certainty”); E. Norman Veasey,
On Corporate Codification: A Historical Peek at the Model Business Corporation
Act and the American Law Institute Principles Through the Delaware Lens,
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 105 (Winter 2011) (acknowledging the author ’s
preference for “the indeterminacy of the Delaware law”).
140. See, e.g., Gorris et al., supra note 137, at 108 (acknowledging that “the
current MBCA remains arguably a better model than the current DGCL for
states lacking Delaware’s highly developed judicial system and corporate case
law”).
141. E.g., id. at 116 (“ The Council, similar to the [ABA’s] Committee on Corporate Laws, receives input from a national constituency about areas for statutory improvement; but the Council acts faster to address new issues and proposed changes.”).
142. Corporate Laws Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N (last modified Mar. 8, 2018),
https://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL270000.
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“Council”). 143 Both offer comment periods before finalizing their
work. 144
The drafters differ in that Council members are Delaware
lawyers, responsible only to Delaware, and free to pursue Delaware’s interest in maintaining its revenue flow. 145 By contrast,
Committee members are from a diversity of states and are drafting for states other than their own—states that have a variety of
interests other than charter competition. Delaware’s Council
meets secretly, whenever necessary, and the Delaware legislature adopts its recommendations without process or deliberation.146 By contrast, the Committee meets four times a year,
without regard to legislative schedules.147 In most MBCA-adopting states, corporate bar associations and other interest groups
actively participate in the legislative process and slow it down.
Non-MBCA-adopting states, such as Nevada, could in theory adopt Delaware’s process. But the non-MBCA states tend to
be larger, and larger states are more likely to have interest
groups that will insist on participation in the legislative process.148
The speed of Delaware’s response proved decisive in the
largest corporate law upheaval of the modern era. In its 1985
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
held directors personally liable for damages in the sale of a $690
million company. 149 The case immediately became a corporate

143. E.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware
Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (2006) (“[ F ]or decades now the
function of identifying and crafting legislative initiatives in the field of corporate
law has been performed by the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State
Bar Association. In particular, it is the governing body of the Corporation Law
Section—its Council—that develops such initiatives.”).
144. Id. at 1758 (noting that the Council’s recommendations must be approved by the Corporation Law Section and the Delaware Bar ’s Executive Committee before being submitted to the legislature).
145. The Council is comprised of Delaware State Bar Association members
and lacks any non-Delaware lawyers. Id. at 1755–56.
146. Id. at 1754 (“ The members of the Delaware General Assembly, however, have not taken on any significant role in initiating or drafting changes to
the DGCL. Nor are those amendments the product of any legislative staff, or of
any lobbyists engaged by individual businesses.”).
147. See Corporate Laws Committee, supra note 142 (noting that the Committee has “[t]hree standalone in-person meetings a year plus an in-person
meeting at the Business Law Section Spring Meeting”).
148. For example, California and New York are non-MBCA states. See State
Corporation Laws, supra note 136.
149. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
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cause célèbre.150 Delaware quickly enacted legislation allowing
companies to exculpate directors of all liability for breach of the
duty of care, making it the only state in which a corporation
could do so. 151 Professor Sarath Sanga reports that “[f]ollowing
the adoption of [the exculpation legislation], the reincorporation
rate [to Delaware] spiked more than five-fold and achieved an
historical maximum. Within three years, the reincorporation
rate returned to pre-shock levels.” 152 By the speed of its response, Delaware was able to convert a calamity of its own making into a major source of new incorporations.
In summary, Delaware’s system for amending its corporatelaw package provides Delaware with three important advantages. First, Delaware’s system allows the drafters to focus
directly on competitive advantage. Second, Delaware can more
quickly and easily amend its package legislatively, because the
process is entirely in-state and interest groups other than the
state bar do not participate. Third, by their rulings in cases, Delaware’s courts can amend the package without legislation.
D. COURT REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS
The third subsystem of the system for corporate regulation
is the one by which the incorporation states enforce their corporation laws. States can enforce some aspects of their laws administratively. For example, all states require that incorporators
furnish information to the state as a condition of incorporation.
If an incorporator does not furnish the information, the state can
refuse the filing and the corporation does not come into existence.153 If a corporation fails or refuses to pay renewal fees or
franchise taxes, its charter becomes void.154 If a corporation
abuses or misuses its charter, the state can obtain an order from

150. E.g., Bryn R. Vaaler, 2.02(b)(4) or Not 2.02(b)(4): That Is the Question,
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 81 (Winter 2011) (describing the Van Gorkom
decision as having “sent shock waves through the corporate world”).
151. Id. (“Faced with the fear of a mass exodus of qualified directors from
the boardrooms of Delaware corporations, the Delaware legislature adopted section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL within eighteen months [of the Van Gorkom decision].”).
152. Sarath Sanga, Network Effects in Corporate Governance 4 (Nw. Univ.
Pritzker Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 17-31, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086245.
153. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103, 106 (2018).
154. E.g., id. § 510 (voiding the charters of corporations that fail or refuse to
pay fees or franchise taxes).

2018]

CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION

2135

a court of the state revoking the charter. 155 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,156 the states have also reserved the power to revoke
or amend charters by statute. 157 The predominant view is that
only the state that issued the charter can revoke it. 158 In the aggregate, those rights provide the states with virtually complete
control over the states’ relationships with the corporations they
charter.
Those rights do not, however, entitle the chartering states
to resolve corporations’ disputes with their stakeholders. In the
absence of legislation or agreement, stakeholders can sue the
corporation or its other stakeholders wherever they can obtain
jurisdiction. Which courts resolve those disputes and how they
resolve them can determine the nature and quality of the law a
state can deliver to the state’s corporate customers.
States can achieve greater control over the interpretation
and enforcement of their corporate laws by providing and controlling the courts that resolve disputes under them. Perhaps
even more importantly, by providing and controlling the courts,
states can obtain better feedback on the interpretation, enforcement, and reception of their laws. That feedback may enable
states to design and implement more attractive corporation
laws.
State control over the forums in which corporate stakeholders can litigate potentially exists across a wide spectrum. At one
extreme, a chartering state might provide that disputes among
the corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders be
resolved only in the chartering state’s courts. 159 A state might
155. E.g., id. § 284 (granting the state court jurisdiction to “revoke or forfeit
the charter of any corporation for abuse, misuse or nonuse of its corporate powers, privileges or franchises”).
156. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
157. E.g., tit. 8, § 394 (reserving the power to amend Delaware charters).
158. Montana v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), 484 B.R. 360, 370 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2012) (“[T]he courts of several states have held that jurisdiction to dissolve a
corporation rests only in the courts of the state of incorporation.”).
159. A state cannot prevent another state from adjudicating a dispute under
the first state’s laws, but other states could accede to such a requirement as a
matter of comity. In re Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Tr., 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch.
2014) (“In my view, Delaware also cannot unilaterally preclude a sister state
from hearing claims under its law.”); Sarah C. Haan, Federalizing the Foreign
Corporate Form, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 925, 943 (2011) (“ The notion that only a
state’s own courts could “interfere with” or “control” a state’s corporations disappeared, and courts interpreted the doctrine to mean that any court could apply the corporate law of the state of incorporation to an out-of-state corporation.”).
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allow such disputes to be resolved by any court with jurisdiction
over the parties, but allow the corporation—by a charter or bylaw provision—to require that resolution be only in the chartering state’s courts. 160 A state might provide a specialized court
that hears only corporate-law cases, a specialized court that
hears corporate and other business cases, or only courts of general jurisdiction. 161 The state might take steps to assure that the
judges of its specialized courts have business expertise or require
that its specialized courts publish their opinions. 162 A state
might allow the corporation to require that resolution be in any
court of the corporation’s choosing.163 At the other extreme, a
state might allow resolution of all disputes by arbitration 164 or
be legally unable to prevent charter or bylaw provisions requiring that all disputes be resolved by arbitration. 165
Because Delaware charters fifty-five percent of public corporations, Delaware generates the largest proportion of corporate
litigation. 166 As a result, Delaware is able to provide a Chancery
Court that has the highest degree of corporate specialization
among the states. 167 The effect is that Delaware has a high degree of control over how its corporation law is interpreted and
enforced and a high level of feedback on how to make its law
more attractive.
Delaware’s closest competitor, Nevada, generates a much
smaller proportion of corporate litigation. Nevada provides a

160. E.g., tit. 8, § 115.
161. At present, no state has a court that hears only corporate-law cases.
Numerous states have specialized business courts or business dockets.
162. Joshua Halen, Transforming Nevada into the Judicial Delaware of the
West; How To Fix Nevada’s Business Courts, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 139, 143 (2015)
(“ The Nevada Chancery Subcommittee focused on four areas of improvement to
the Nevada Business Courts: (1) the need for published opinions[;] (2) time to
disposition of cases[;] (3) expertise of business court judges[;] and (4) establishing judicial precedent.”).
163. This was the effect of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Boilermakers v. Chevron prior to the adoption of title 8, section 115 of the Delaware
Code. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron, 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch.
2013).
164. See, e.g., Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 24-C-13001111, 2013 WL 1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013) (enforcing an arbitration
bylaw under Maryland law).
165. Allen, supra note 3, at 754–57 (discussing the availability of arbitration
over state objections).
166. See supra Table 2.
167. Allen, supra note 3, at 808.
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specialized “Business Court” at two locations within the state 168
and maintains that “[s]election of judges is based on their specialized experience in business litigation.” 169 The Nevada Business Court is, however, more a separate docket than a separate
court. It does not publish its opinions. 170 Delaware’s Chancery
Court provides Delaware with substantially greater control over
the interpretation and enforcement of Delaware’s corporation
law than the Nevada Business Court provides to Nevada. That,
in turn, gives Delaware an important advantage over Nevada in
the charter competition.
E. INSULATION FROM DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
An important feature of the system for corporate regulation
is that the system is insulated from democratic control. 171 In a
simple model of democratic control, citizens elect representatives
who enact legislation. That legislation contains the rules by
which the society operates.
In the system for corporate regulation, no group of citizens
elects representatives who decide how corporations are regulated. To put it another way, no point of entry exists through
which any group of citizens can decide whether corporate regulations are necessary. I consider the relevant groups of citizens
in three categories: (1) citizens of incorporation states, such as
Delaware; (2) citizens of doing-business states, such as California; and (3) citizens of the United States.
1. Insulation from Citizens of Incorporation States
Citizens of the incorporation state have the right, but not
the power, to regulate public companies. The incorporation state
citizens have that right only because the companies chose to incorporate there. The company likely chose the state because the
168. See, e.g., Business Courts, SILVERFLUME, https://www.nvsilverflume
.gov/wN?businessCourts (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“ The establishment of the
business court is an embodiment of Nevada’s efforts to attract corporations and
other business entities to organize in Nevada.”); id. (“Official business courts
are established in Reno (Second Judicial District Court) and Las Vegas (Eighth
Judicial District Court).”).
169. Id.
170. Halen, supra note 162, at 165 (“ The main concerns of the Business
Courts have been its broad subject matter jurisdiction, retention of juries, and
unpublished opinions.”).
171. Greenfield, supra note 41, at 142 (“Corporations located outside of Delaware can adopt Delaware’s laws for their internal affairs, leaving non-shareholder stakeholders affected by those laws but with no democratic mechanism
to influence those laws.”).
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state does not impose significant regulation. If the incorporation
state’s citizens do impose significant regulation, the company
can reincorporate in a state whose citizens will not, and the company will remain unregulated. Regulation is thus beyond the citizens’ power.
Delaware’s legislative process illustrates the emptiness of
its citizens’ choice. The citizens of Delaware elect the legislature,
but the legislature does not hold hearings or deliberate with respect to corporate law. It rubber-stamps the decisions of the Delaware corporate bar. 172 Nor does the Delaware corporate bar
have the power to impose significant regulation. If it tried, public
companies would leave Delaware and Delaware would lose about
twenty-five percent of its state revenues. 173 Because the corporate charter competition exists, no one in Delaware has the
power to impose significant corporate regulation, even if all considered it necessary for the nation’s economic system to operate
well.
2. Insulation from Citizens of Doing-Business States
States have the right to regulate foreign corporations doing
business within their borders. 174 That right to regulate exists
even though the company is incorporated elsewhere, provided
that the regulation does not interfere with interstate commerce. 175
However, all fifty states have adopted the internal affairs
doctrine as their conflicts of law rule with respect to public companies. 176 If a state merely adopts a corporate regulation, the
regulation will not apply to the large majority of public companies because they are incorporated in other states. 177 To make
172. See Hamermesh, supra note 143, at 1754.
173. DEFAC GENERAL FUND REVENUE WORKSHEET, supra note 127, at 1
(recording Delaware’s net revenue for fiscal year 2017 as $3.9 billion, with net
franchise and LP/LLC fees comprising $983.9 million of that total).
174. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 652 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
(“It has been held both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment that a State
may impose on a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within
its borders more onerous conditions than it imposes on domestic companies.”).
175. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1:4 (3d ed. 2010) (“As a consequence of [corporations] being denied
citizenship status, states may, as a valid exercise of their police powers, regulate
foreign corporations conducting business within their borders, provided the regulations do not impermissibly affect commerce.”).
176. See supra note 52 and accompany text.
177. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (describing the impact of
the internal affairs doctrine).
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its regulation applicable to foreign corporations, the state would
have to change its conflicts rule.
Rejection of the internal affairs doctrine would put the rejecting state’s conflicts of law rule in conflict with that of every
other state. As a result, the regulation enacted would apply only
in cases filed in the enacting state. Other states would continue
to apply the law of the incorporation state. Rejection would signal “business-unfriendliness,” and risk the loss of not just incorporations, but also some amount of business activity.
As a result, the citizens of a state lack the power to regulate
foreign corporations doing business in the state. The severe adverse consequences following any attempt to regulate would not
result from the regulation, but rather from the state’s disturbance of the charter competition’s structure. The effect of that disturbance would likely overwhelm the effect of the regulation.
3. Insulation from Citizens of the United States
Scholars agree that the federal government has the right to
make corporate law, including the right to preempt the states
from making it. 178 The federal government actually regulates
disclosure in connection with sales of securities and a small, unimportant miscellany of other matters. 179
Federal regulation is not, however, a point of entry through
which U.S. citizens can decide whether corporate regulation is
needed. Federal regulation would violate a long-standing norm,
might itself be frustrated by international charter competition,
and is impractical because the U.S. Senate is structured in a
manner that gives Delaware an effective veto.180
By long-standing tradition, the federal government regulates only securities disclosures. 181 The remainder of corporate
178. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 624 (“Congress could
draw on the same Commerce Clause on which it draws in supplementing the
state system to occupy the entire field of corporate law.”).
179. E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat.
745, 787–88 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)) (prohibiting
personal loans to executives).
180. David R. Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 31, 33–34 (2003) (“[That Senators do not have equal intensities
across issues] helps to promote continual vote-trading among members and
across issues in the form of explicit or implicit logrolling. In the particular case
of the U.S. Senate, the rules of that body that allow slowdowns give, in effect,
extra stacks of trading chips to intense minorities that face not-so-intense majorities.” (internal citations omitted)).
181. E.g., James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and
Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 179–82 (2017) (arguing that federal law
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law is solely the province of the states. As Bratton and McCahery
put it:
In theory, under the prevailing norm, national regulation covers the
securities markets and mandates transparency respecting firms with
publicly traded securities, while internal corporate affairs are left to
the states. In practice, federal lawmakers sometimes disregard the
norm, entering into internal affairs as the national system grows episodically. But they follow a norm of cooperation even as they make
these incursions. Federal regulators never structure interventions so
as to disrupt the state equilibrium. They leave Delaware in
place . . . . 182

The incursions to which Bratton and McCahery refer have been
minimal. Even in the face of a “corporate governance crisis,” 183
the legislation Congress enacted was primarily addressed at disclosure and had no substantial effect on the rules regarding corporate governance. 184
Even if the federal government imposed corporate regulation, corporations might respond by incorporating in countries
that did not regulate them, while continuing to do business and
raise capital in the United States. The corporate law of the new
countries of incorporation would apply, 185 the United States
should be confined to stock trading issues, while state law should operate in a
separate domain free from federal interference); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521, 1527 (2005) (“[T]he substantive corporate governance provisions [of Sarbanes-Oxley] overstep the traditional division between federal and state jurisdiction . . . .”); id. at 1597 (claiming that “the SOX mandates . . . are not proper
subjects for federal government action”). But see Robert Thompson, Delaware’s
Dominance: A Peculiar Illustration of American Federalism, in CAN DELAWARE
BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW
57, 62 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) (“Federal rules regularly use
disclosure requirements to muscle management toward a desired substantive
result.”).
182. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 620.
183. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling
Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 355 (2003) (“[T]he corporate governance crisis in
America, with Enron as its poster child, represents a failure of both our system
of mandatory rules, and of the contracting processes, which, together, constitute
the infrastructure of the U.S. corporate governance system.” (emphasis omitted)).
184. Veasey, supra note 139, at 97 (“Congress has moved in the direction of
some federalization of corporate-governance structures by the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Yet, even with
those federal intrusions, state-based corporate law, including the business judgment rule, is mostly unharmed.” (emphasis omitted)).
185. See, e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217–19 (Del. 1987)
(applying the law of Panama to a company headquartered in the United States
but incorporated in Panama).
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would suffer the embarrassment of an incorporation outflow,
and the corporations would remain unregulated. 186
Lastly, the U.S. Senate is structured in a manner that allows Delaware to block any legislation that threatens its position.187 Delaware has two Senators, the same number as states
with forty times its population. Because Delaware’s intense financial interest in preventing federal corporate regulation so
overwhelms the state’s other interests, Delaware’s Senators can
choose committee assignments, place holds on legislation, 188 and
trade their votes to prevent federal corporate regulation. 189
The failure to regulate corporate law is not the result of contemporary political decisions at either the state or federal level.
Corporations doing business in the United States are beyond
democratic control for historical reasons having nothing to do
with current needs.190
II. DELAWARE’S JUDICIAL STRATEGY
In the context of systems analysis, strategies are “changes
in conduct by a system participant made with the intention to
improve the participant’s treatment by the system.” 191 This Part
examines Delaware’s competitive strategy to determine its nature and its effect on the system. The examination shows Delaware’s strategy is principally judicial and highly dependent on
Delaware’s ability to attract cases to its courts.
Strategies are plans for achieving goals. Scholars agree that
maintaining Delaware’s billion-dollar-a-year revenue flow from
fees and franchise taxes is at least one of Delaware’s goals. They
differ as to whether maintaining Delaware’s flow of shareholder
186. Bebchuk, supra note 64, at 1508 (“[E]ven when an issue is governed by
a federal rule, companies may still have some ability to opt out of this rule by
incorporating abroad.”). But see Haan, supra note 159, at 955–60 (showing that
U.S. courts usually apply U.S. law to the issue of veil-piercing of non-U.S. corporations).
187. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 123 (2005) (noting
that Delaware Senator Joseph Biden “engineered the omission of venue reform
from the [1996] omnibus bankruptcy bill” and that change allowed Delaware to
continue its dominance of large, public company bankruptcy).
188. MARK J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “HOLDS” IN THE SENATE 1
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43563.pdf (describing the process by which
even a single senator can delay or prevent Senate action).
189. See Mayhew, supra note 180.
190. LOPUCKI, supra note 187, at 4–8 (explaining how Delaware achieved
dominance in the charter competition in the period 1899–1913).
191. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1996).
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litigation is a separate goal promoted by the Delaware bar for its
own benefit, 192 or an essential part of the state’s strategy for
maintaining its revenue flow. 193
This Part argues for the latter view. Delaware has rationally
chosen to maintain its case flow, because maintaining Delaware’s case flow is essential to maintaining Delaware’s revenue
flow. Delaware’s Chancery Court and body of precedent are
widely acknowledged to be central to Delaware’s attractiveness.
Without shareholder litigation, the Chancery Court would confer
no advantage and its body of precedent would quickly become an
historical artifact. Delaware’s judiciary is not an add-on; it is an
essential part of the package Delaware offers. Delaware’s choice
to double down on its risky judicial strategy is thus not an error
but merely a demonstration of the precariousness of Delaware’s
position. Other strategies present even greater risks to Delaware’s continuation in its role as the nation’s de facto corporate
lawgiver.
A. DELAWARE’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGE
Americans have a low opinion of large corporations. 194 Maintaining the legitimacy of a nondemocratic system that confers
192. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted
Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 873 (2016) (arguing that the fee-shifting issue
“presented an unprecedented conflict between the interests of the State and
those of Delaware lawyers”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472
(1987) (“[T]he rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts to
maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state.”); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private Enforcement?, COLUM.
L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia
.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-it-still-believe-in-private
-enforcement [https://perma.cc/QD6P-N9TX] (“Delaware is uniquely conflicted
on this issue, because ATP Tour could imply a significant decline in Delawarebased litigation, but such a decline would greatly benefit management and directors of Delaware corporations. Never before have the interests of the Delaware bar and its clients clashed so directly.”).
193. Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1681 (2016) (concluding that Delaware’s prohibition on fee shifting bylaws “can be rationalized as preserving the critical component of judicial lawmaking as part of the package that constitutes Delaware
corporate law”).
194. See, e.g., Big Business, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5248/big
-business.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (reporting that, as of this writing,
thirty-four percent of respondents were satisfied with “the size and influence of
major corporations,” five percent were dissatisfied but wanted major corporations to have more influence, fifty percent were dissatisfied but wanted major
corporations to have less influence, and nine percent were dissatisfied but
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power and privilege on large corporations and allows them to
regulate themselves is no small task. Despite that challenge,
Delaware’s corporate-law regime is highly regarded. 195
Should the popular perception of Delaware corporate law
turn sharply negative, Delaware could be replaced in a variety
of ways. In Part III, I suggest that corporations might reject Delaware in favor of cheaper states, but that is only one of several
possibilities. In extreme circumstances, the federal government
might be able to enact regulatory corporate law or replace state
chartering with federal chartering.196 States could reject the internal affairs doctrine and instead directly regulate the corporations headquartered or doing business within their borders. 197

wanted corporations to “keep [their] influence as it is now”); Views of Banks,
Large Corporations, Small Businesses Improve Since 2010, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec.
31, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/04/millennials-views
-of-news-media-religious-organizations-grow-more-negative/ft_16-01-04_
millennialviews_improve (reporting the proportions of various groups “who say
[large corporations] have a positive effect on the way things are going in this
country today” as ranging from twenty-one to thirty-eight percent); The BursonMarsteller CNBC Corporate Perception Indicator, BURSON-MARSTELLER (Aug.
15, 2014), http://www.burson-marsteller.com/what-we-do/our-thinking/the
-burson-marstellercnbc-corporate-perception-indicator/the-burson
-marstellercnbc-corporate-perception-indicator/#! (last visited Apr. 14, 2018)
(finding on slide 14 that members of the general public in developed markets
believe by a margin of forty-six to thirty-five percent “it is a bad thing when
corporations are strong and influential, because they rig the system so they do
not have to act responsibly”).
195. Allen, supra note 3, at 808 (referring to the Delaware Court of Chancery
as “a highly regarded judiciary with the proven ability to act swiftly based upon
a developed body of case law”); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 620
(“Delaware legitimately plays a national role.”); Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen
A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A
Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 354 (2013) (“In the
case of Delaware-chartered corporations, the incentive to have intra-corporate
disputes resolved by Delaware courts is arguably even greater because of the
high regard in which Delaware’s courts are held and the efficiency with which
they resolve complex business disputes.”); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 57, 60 (2009) (“Delaware’s corporate law enjoys extraordinary respect
and prestige, as do the state’s corporate lawyers and judges.”).
196. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2498
(2005) (“In nearly every decade of the twentieth century, the decade's major corporate law issue either went federal or federal authorities threatened to take it
over.”).
197. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 49, at 1096 (advocating that states abandon
strict adherence to the internal affairs doctrine).
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Private regulators such as stock exchanges or shareholder advisory services could become the de facto regulators. 198 Corporations themselves could reject charter competition in favor of a
level playing field administered by some neutral institution. Alternative forms of business organization, controlled by customers, employees, franchisees, local governments, or others could
arise.
Those possibilities put Delaware in a bind. To maintain its
legitimacy, Delaware must appear to impose meaningful regulation. But to attract incorporations, it must not impose meaningful regulation. That may explain why corporate law hovers near
emptiness but consistently avoids getting there.
B. DELAWARE’S STRATEGY
Delaware’s strategy for appearing to regulate without actually doing so has three elements: (1) Delaware portrays its law
as authorizing a system of private ordering; (2) obscures its actual methods through verbosity and complexity; and (3) administers its grant of power and privilege through a loyal and sophisticated judiciary over which Delaware has substantially
complete control.
1. Private Ordering
Delaware characterizes its lack of regulation as “private ordering.”199 The claim is that corporate law governs only the relationship among “the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” 200 Because that relationship is
contractual and among sophisticated parties, it necessitates only
minimal regulation. As then-Chancellor Strine put it: “Delaware’s corporate statute is widely regarded as the most flexible
in the nation because it leaves the parties to the corporate contract (managers and stockholders) with great leeway to struc-

198. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace Class
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 1020
(1999) (“An exchange-based antifraud regime harnesses the markets themselves as effective, low-cost monitors for fraud.”).
199. E.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core,
the Delaware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which leaves
latitude for substantial private ordering.”).
200. See sources cited supra note 36. But see Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at
376–77 (“No corporate affairs are ever exclusively ‘internal’; they will always
have consequences of greater or lesser magnitude on the ‘outside’ world.”).
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ture their relations, subject to relatively loose statutory constraints and to the policing of director misconduct through equitable review.” 201
Delaware’s defenders posit that the private ordering thus
facilitated enables Delaware corporations to operate more efficiently. 202 Corporations incorporated in other states either
struggle along at a competitive disadvantage, reincorporate to
Delaware, or were incorporated in their home jurisdictions for
noneconomic reasons. 203
The private ordering story fails to take into account the powerful negotiating position that corporate law confers on managers, 204 the inability of some affected parties to negotiate at all, 205
and the tremendous impact that the unregulated corporation
has on society.206 But the ideology of private ordering serves its
function by existing and remaining plausible as an explanation
for, and defense of, corporate charter competition.
2. Obfuscation
The second element of Delaware’s strategy is obfuscation. 207
In reality, American corporate law is an absence of regulation
201. Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del.
Ch. 2004).
202. E.g., Romano, supra note 28, at 235 (claiming to show empirically “a
bandwagon effect in favor of adopting a successful innovation” in the charter
competition context).
203. Id. at 278 (“[T]he non-Delaware corporations stressed historical associations with their incorporation state that created a public identification between state and firm.”).
204. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 603 (“[T]he uncertainty of Delaware law disguises the extent to which Delaware’s law favors managers over
shareholders.”); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 621 (“Externalities do
occur because Delaware’s strategy structurally favors management on allocational questions.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Governance and Social Welfare in the Common-Law World, 92 TEX. L. REV. 973, 989 (2014) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013)) (“Delaware’s resolution of most corporate governance issues . . . tends to favor the
interests of managers.”).
205. Cf. Crespi, supra note 39, at 90–91 (noting that a majority of courts
apply the law of the state of incorporation to veil-piercing claims). Most tort
creditors with veil-piercing claims cannot negotiate at all.
206. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887,
894–96 (2018) (arguing that charter competition may prevent U.S. jurisdictions
from banning entities controlled by malicious software).
207. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 603 (“Explicit, bright-line rules
favoring managers could conceivably encourage shareholder groups to push for
federal intervention. In contrast, indeterminate standards applied by courts in
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that is effectively beyond democratic control.208 If generally understood, the current arrangement would be politically unacceptable.209 The arrangement survives in large part because the
complexity of the charter competition and the complexity, indeterminacy, and verbosity of the resulting law obscure it.
More specifically, the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) lacks clarity, 210 is excessively lengthy as a whole, 211 is
expressed in sentences that are themselves extraordinarily
lengthy and complex, 212 is deliberately redundant, 213 and eschews the within-sentence-paragraphing that is used in nearly
all other statutes and regulations to reduce ambiguity and make
them easier to read. Delaware court opinions are also unnecessarily lengthy and obscure. 214 They multiply legal distinctions

case-specific ways make the extent to which Delaware’s law favors managers
much less salient.”).
208. See supra Part I.E.
209. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 603 (“[I]ndeterminate standards
applied by courts in case-specific ways make the extent to which Delaware’s law
favors managers much less salient.”); Greenfield, supra note 41, at 136 (arguing
that the “ability of corporations to elect their governance law is illegitimate as
a democratic matter and inefficient as an economic matter ”).
210. See Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 50 (“Even the briefest comparison of the Delaware statute’s language with the Model Act’s language
demonstrates the Model Act’s much greater clarity and precision.”); Jens C.
Dammann, Indeterminacy in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Comparative
Analysis, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 54, 56 (2013) (“Prominent voices in the literature
argue that regulatory competition has made Delaware law inefficiently indeterminate.”).
211. The Delaware General Corporation Law is more than 100,000 words.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2018). By contrast, the Nevada Corporation Law is
less than 50,000 words. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 75.010–92a.500 (2017).
212. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 50 (noting that the first sentence of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) contains 952 words and is “virtually
impossible to read”).
213. Harvard Law School Professor Holger Spamann has published a version of the Delaware General Corporation Law that is half as long, without alteration of meaning, simply by removing redundancies. See Del. Gen. Corp. L.,
SIMPLIFIED CODES, http://simplifiedcodes.com/?page_id=39 (last visited Apr. 14,
2018).
214. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998) (“[T]he well-documented
indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law . . . is evident in the state’s ample use
of vague standards that make prediction of legal outcomes difficult. While Delaware law offers relatively clear rules that govern technical aspects of corporate
governance, the fiduciary duties at its core are open-ended.”).
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and categories excessively, 215 describe them indeterminately, 216
and revise them frequently. 217 These characteristics create precisely the opposite of the clear and predictable rules that scholars assume business people prefer. 218 Even on so simple a matter
as which of the rules in its corporation law must be followed and
which may be privately ordered away, Delaware law provides no
answer. 219
Complexity and ambiguity enable Delaware to generate patterns of outcomes that are directly in conflict with the apparent
intent of the rules. One example of this subterfuge is that corporate directors nearly always escape liability for their own wrongdoing. 220 The techniques by which they do it—indemnification,
directors’ and officers’ insurance, and court approval of shareholder litigation settlement—together achieve a result that each
individually purports to prevent. A second example is that directors have a duty of oversight, but the Delaware courts’ verbalization of that duty makes it virtually impossible for directors to
violate it. 221 A third example is that corporate law ostensibly

215. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 12 (“[T]he set of decisions now
contestable in court has grown exponentially.”); id. at 30 (showing graphically
the large number of modes of review recognized in Delaware law).
216. Id. at 15–16 (“Delaware’s high reversal rate is consistent with Delaware
law’s being so indeterminate that Delaware appellate and trial judges disagree
on its application with relative frequency, their specialized expertise notwithstanding.”); Kamar, supra note 214, at 1909; Fisch, supra note 63, at 1063 (“Delaware precedent . . . although well developed . . . is far from clear and predictable.”).
217. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 16–17 (stating that “new rules
have been announced with remarkable regularity”).
218. See id. at 29–30 (citing other scholars’ arguments that the corporate
laws of other states provide greater certainty than Delaware corporate law);
Fisch, supra note 63, at 1099 (“[T]he standards[-]based muddiness of Delaware
law retains a degree of ex post review for which courts are well suited.”).
219. Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 847–48
(Del. Ch. 2004) (rejecting the view that provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law that do not contain “magic words” authorizing modification by a
provision in the certificate or bylaws cannot be modified by a provision in the
certificate or bylaws).
220. Black et al., supra note 14, at 1138 (“As an empirical matter, out-ofpocket liability for outside directors over the last several decades has been
rare.”).
221. For example, the first prong of the Caremark test is breached only if
“the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system
or controls.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006). To fail the test, a corporation would have to have no accounting
system at all.
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bars directors with conflicts of interest from controlling corporate decisions. 222 But at the same time, the law requires that the
courts ignore structural bias—the cultural obligation to reciprocate when a friend or confidant selects one to become a board
member. The effect is to enable conflicted directors to control corporate decisions indirectly across a wide range of situations by
delegating the decisions to friends and confidants. 223
A second function of complexity is to shield Delaware corporate law from criticism by diffusing the criticism’s target. A
vaguely and abstractly stated legal doctrine, qualified by statements scattered throughout a lengthy opinion, is difficult to criticize because it can neither be repeated nor credibly summarized. Similarly, it is difficult to prove that Delaware fails to
regulate corporations when Delaware’s corporation law is more
than 100,000 words in length. 224 No matter how many provisions
are shown to be void of regulation, the possibility remains that
others are not.
A third function of complexity is to make Delaware law difficult to copy. As Kahan and Kamar put it, “fact-intensive and
standard-based law also bolsters Delaware’s market power. It is
hard for other states to replicate such law and to tap Delaware’s
network and learning benefits.” 225 Proving the ability of Delaware judges to express matters clearly when they want to, Chief
Justice Leo Strine summarized: “By making its law a muddle,
Kahan and Kamar say, Delaware makes it difficult for other
states to copy it.” 226
Finally, Delaware’s tolerance for complexity and indeterminacy gives its courts the flexibility to constantly generate new
222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2018).
223. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 647 (Del. 2014) (holding
that a director who had been the controlling shareholder ’s business partner for
twenty years was independent for the purpose of representing the interests of
the minority shareholders in reviewing the controlling shareholder ’s offer to
purchase their shares).
224. See supra note 211.
225. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1247 n.170 (2001); Kahan & Kamar,
supra note 1, at 741 (“[Delaware’s] law would be vulnerable to emulation at low
costs if it were more determinate.”). But see Kamar, supra note 214, at 1910–11
(“[T]he substantive content of Delaware law is unlikely to form a major basis of
Delaware’s competitive advantage, since other jurisdictions can easily copy this
content . . . .”).
226. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate
America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to
Kahan & Kamar ’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1264 n.33 (2001).
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rules and exceptions to existing rules. That in turn enables them
to favor managers in the case before the court without creating
precedent that would bind them in future cases.227
3. Judicial Regulation

Judicial regulation is the third element of Delaware’s strategy. Instead of seeking to provide the right rules, Delaware long
ago elected to avoid rules and instead regulate on a case-by-case
basis.228 As Professor Jill Fisch has noted, “Delaware corporate
law relies on judicial lawmaking to a greater extent than other
states.” 229 Fiduciary standards and standards of review dominate Delaware corporate law. Delaware’s statutes include neither. 230 The vagueness and complexity of Delaware’s judicial
opinions make it difficult to predict how the courts will decide
future cases. Delaware’s proponents all but concede that, without its courts, Delaware would have no advantage over other
states.231
The function of this ambiguity is to enable Delaware to address threats to its reputation, 232 while permitting managers
who do not pose such threats to do virtually anything they
please. 233 Professor Edward Rock observes:
227. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (characterizing Delaware corporate law as “a set of stories that is typically not reducible to a rule”).
228. Fisch, supra note 63, at 1076 (“Delaware courts also apply the relevant
legal standards in a fact and case specific manner. As a result, one court’s determination that a particular course of dealing was reasonable under the relevant legal test provides little guidance to corporate actors about subsequent decisions applying the same legal test.”).
229. Id. at 1074.
230. Id. at 1074–75.
231. Gorris et al., supra note 137, at 108 (“[T]he current MBCA remains arguably a better model than the current DGCL for states lacking Delaware’s
highly developed judicial system and corporate case law.”).
232. In Puda Coal, two directors in China stole all of the assets of a public
Delaware company eighteen months before the three U.S. directors realized it.
30 F. Supp. 3d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In rejecting the technically sound argument
of the U.S. directors for a resolution that would leave the shareholder derivative
action in the control of one of the wrongdoers, Chancellor Strine noted the interests of Delaware: “I’m just wondering how, if my state embraces this, we are
not subject to totally legitimate ridicule.” Transcript of Oral Argument and the
Court’s Ruling at 6–7, In re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders Litig. (Del. Ch. Feb.
19, 2013) (No. 6476-CS).
233. See Rock, supra note 227, at 1013 (“[T]he Delaware courts provide a
supplemental source of gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors who
are beyond the reach of the firm’s normal systems of social control.”); id. at 1106
(“ The core of my claim is that we should understand Delaware fiduciary duty
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Directors of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long
as it is not illegal, and as long as they act in good faith . . . . [T]he formulation is largely empty until the concept of good faith is defined. . . .
[T]he Delaware courts fill out the concept of “good faith” through factintensive, normatively saturated descriptions of manager, director,
and lawyer conduct, and of process—descriptions that are not reducible
to rules . . . . 234

Courts can use doctrines such as bad faith, proper purpose, and
reasonableness to distinguish litigants who have done something in a clumsy or striking manner—with the potential to embarrass Delaware—from other litigants who have reached the
same end in a graceful and inconspicuous manner that poses no
threat to Delaware. By making that distinction, Delaware can
maximize its delegation of privilege and power, while minimizing risks to its legitimacy.
Delaware’s strategy requires that the state maintain its own
court system.235 First, judges must take Delaware’s interests
into account, even though those interests are not legally relevant. That is, judges must decide cases in ways that protect the
state’s efforts to sell charters. 236 Only judges employed by Delaware have direct incentives to do that. Second, the lawyers who
practice before the Delaware Chancery Court are the principal
source of information and advice to the Delaware Legislature.
The lawyers function as the legislature’s eyes and ears and as a
check on Delaware’s judiciary.237 The requirement that each
maintain an office in the state assures these lawyers’ loyalty to
the state. 238 Third, Delaware’s delivered law is largely a product
of Delaware’s judicial culture. 239 The results would be markedly
law as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors,
tales that collectively describe their normative role.”).
234. Id. at 1015.
235. See Veasey, supra note 139, at 96 (“A rational corporation law or corporate-governance regime, such as Delaware’s, depends on a rich body of case law
and the expertise, prompt service, and independence of, and trust in, the judiciary.”).
236. See, e.g., supra note 232 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
238. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 170(a) (“Any person admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of this State shall be entitled to practice as an attorney in this
Court so long as such person . . . maintains an office in this State for the practice
of law.”).
239. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on
Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (“Enabling acts,
such as the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), are part of the corporate law. They create only a skeletal framework, however. The ‘flesh and blood’
of corporate law is judge-made.”).
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different if the judges of other states or arbitrators applied Delaware law. As Chancellor Strine put it:
The important coherence-generating benefits created by our judiciary’s
handling of corporate disputes are endangered if our state’s compelling
public policy interest in deciding these disputes is not recognized and
decisions are instead routinely made by a variety of state and federal
judges who only deal episodically with our law. 240

Lastly, judicial lawmaking through a small, concentrated judiciary without juries further renders Delaware’s system impervious to copying. 241
Thus Delaware is committed to a strategy that maintains
and leverages the existence of its uniquely specialized court system. To abandon its judicial strategy would leave Delaware with
little more than its vaunted reputation and its familiarity. To
stick with its judicial strategy, Delaware must attract both incorporations and cases. Change that threatens the flow of Delaware litigation threatens Delaware.
C. THE JUDICIAL STRATEGY’S DECLINE
Despite the inherent conflict between the policies that will
attract incorporations and those that will attract shareholder litigation, Delaware managed to do both until 2001. That year, the
Delaware Chancery Court cut the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees in the
Digex case. 242 The court continued making cuts in later cases. 243
Although the numbers of business organization cases filed in the
Chancery Court has remained roughly the same since then, Delaware is apparently suffering substantial losses in its market
share of the litigation against Delaware corporations.244
To stem the loss of market share, Delaware employed two
strategies simultaneously. First, in early 2009, Delaware began
offering Delaware corporations secret arbitration by Chancery
240. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007).
241. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 708 (noting that the Delaware
Chancery Court “hears all cases without a jury”).
242. See John Armour et al., supra note 8, at 1371 (“[The] law firm sought
approval for a $24.75 million fee [but was] instead awarded $12.3 million . . . .”).
243. John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 643–45 (2012) (attributing Delaware’s loss of shareholder litigation to “more intensive fee scrutiny” beginning with the Digex fee cut in 2001).
244. Id. at 607 (reporting “a large decline in the proportion of corporate lawsuits involving Delaware companies . . . filed in Delaware courts” after 2001,
based on data for the period 1994–2010); Stevelman, supra note 195, at 61
(“[D]isputes in high-profile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions and
allegations of fiduciary self-dealing governed by Delaware corporate law are
more commonly being litigated outside of Delaware’s state courts.”).
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Court judges “in a Delaware courthouse during normal business
hours.” 245 The authorizing legislation declared that the state did
so to “preserve Delaware’s preeminence in offering cost-effective
options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology matters.” 246 This secret arbitration option would have made Delaware’s Chancery Court
more attractive, but in a two-to-one decision in 2013, the Third
Circuit ruled that secret arbitration before sitting judges violated the First Amendment right of public access to government
dispute resolution proceedings.247 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari,248 and Delaware responded by abandoning the arbitration of shareholder litigation altogether. 249
The second strategy, forum-selection bylaws, met with quick
success. In early 2010, a Delaware Chancery Court judge suggested that Delaware corporations adopt bylaws limiting the
venues in which their shareholders could sue them. 250 Over 250
publicly traded companies adopted forum-selection bylaws even
before the Delaware Chancery Court validated them in 2013. 251
Technically, Boilermakers v. Chevron allowed forum-selection
bylaws to direct shareholder litigation anywhere. 252 But shortly
after the decision, the Delaware legislature limited forum-selection bylaws to directing litigation solely to Delaware. 253 Delaware’s new strategy was then clear. Instead of trying to attract
plaintiff’s attorneys to file their cases in Delaware, Delaware
245. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir.
2013).
246. H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009).
247. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 733 F.3d at 521.
248. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
249. See Delaware’s Options for Alternative Dispute Resolution, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/alternative-dispute-resolution (last
visited Apr. 14, 2018) (noting that Delaware courts offer mediation and appoint
arbitrators).
250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would
provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
251. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934,
939, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013).
252. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 230–
31 (Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding a bylaw directing litigation to the corporations’
home states).
253. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2018) (“[N]o provision of the certificate of
incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing [internal corporate] claims
in the courts of this state.”).
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and its corporations would join forces to require plaintiffs’ attorneys to file their cases in Delaware. From 2010 through 2015,
the number of business cases filed in the Delaware Chancery
Court increased by more than sixty percent. 254
In 2014, the conflict between attracting incorporations and
attracting litigation resurfaced with the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund
(ATP Tour). 255 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
a bylaw that required the members of a nonprofit corporation—
the equivalent of shareholders—to pay the corporation’s attorneys’ fees if they sued but did not win the “full remedy sought.” 256
The ATP Tour decision would have discouraged shareholder litigation and probably delighted corporate managers. The Delaware legislature quickly reversed the decision by prohibiting all
fee-shifting bylaws. 257 The Council made the decision for the Delaware legislature. The Council explained that “few stockholders
will rationally be able to accept the risk of exposure to millions
of dollars in attorneys’ fees to attempt to rectify a perceived corporate wrong, no matter how egregious.” 258 By reversing ATP
Tour, Delaware was deliberately allowing shareholders to continue suing its corporations.
Professor Stephen Bainbridge characterizes Delaware’s reversal of ATP Tour as a “self-inflicted wound” 259 that “threatens
to undermine Delaware’s profitable position as the leading state
of incorporation.” 260 Bainbridge argues that shareholder litigation is excessive, corporations’ “key constituencies” could have
used fee-shifting bylaws to reduce the inefficient portions of it,
and Delaware’s prohibition of fee-shifting bylaws will cause Delaware corporations to reincorporate in states that permit feeshifting bylaws.261

254. See infra Figure 2.
255. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
256. Id. at 560.
257. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2018) (“ The bylaws may not contain
any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees
or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal
corporate claim . . . .”).
258. COUNCIL EXPLANATION, supra note 27, at 4.
259. Bainbridge, supra note 192, at 876.
260. Id.; see also DiCiancia, supra note 7, at 1574 (“[T]he Delaware courts
have a strong interest in authorizing fee shifting in securities class actions to
protect this status.”).
261. Bainbridge, supra note 192, at 870–71, 875 (discussing specific states).
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While the controversy over ATP Tour continued, yet another
case-retention problem erupted. In January 2016, the Delaware
Chancery Court refused to approve a “disclosure settlement” 262
in the Trulia shareholder litigation.263 The court was concerned
that the additional information Trulia furnished to the shareholder class pursuant to the settlement would not have been
meaningful, while $375,000 of corporate funds would have been
paid to the plaintiffs’ attorneys 264 and the corporate defendant
would have received a release that might have prevented other
shareholders from later filing meritorious litigation. 265 In its
opinion refusing to approve the settlement, the court acknowledged that its “enhanced judicial scrutiny of disclosure settlements could lead plaintiffs to sue fiduciaries of Delaware corporations in other jurisdictions in the hope of finding a forum more
hospitable to signing off on settlements of no genuine value,” immediately adding that it “is within the power of a Delaware corporation to enact a forum selection bylaw to address this concern.” 266

262. A disclosure settlement is a settlement in which the plaintiff shareholder class receives nothing but additional information. John Marsalek et al.,
The Demise of Disclosure-Only Settlements?, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Jan. 28,
2016), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/
01/demise-of-disclosure-only-settlements.
263. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 908 (Del. Ch. 2016).
264. Id. at 890.
265. Id. at 898 (“[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements
are likely to be met with continued disfavor . . . unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject
matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing
more than disclosure claims . . . .”).
266. Id. at 899.
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Figure 2: Number of Business Organization Cases Filed
in the Delaware Chancery Court

But the corporations did not invoke forum selection bylaws.
They preferred to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees in, and get
their releases from, more hospitable forums.267 Trulia sparked
another large outflow of shareholder litigation from Delaware,
erasing Delaware’s nominal gains in filings since 2010.268
Figure 2 shows the number of “business organization” cases
shown on the Delaware Chancery Court dockets posted on
Westlaw. The increase from 2008 to 2014 and the decline 2015
to 2016 are largely merger settlement litigation in which multiple cases are filed, and nothing but settlement approval actually
litigated. Delaware’s corporate cases probably declined in the period from 2000 to 2004. 269
267. Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven Davidoff Simon & Randall S. Thomas, eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 18), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855950 (“[O]nce the corporation
has become a defendant in merger litigation, that corporation has a strong incentive to buy the broad, cheap releases that disclosure settlements provide.”).
268. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 3 (2016) (“Plaintiffs filed in Delaware for 61 percent of the litigated deals
over the first three quarters of 2015 but only 26 percent of litigated deals in [the
fourth quarter of 2015 and the first half of 2016].”).
269. John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 687, 705 fig. 1 (2009) (showing slight decline).
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The outflow demonstrated a crucial limitation of Delaware’s
litigation retention strategy. Forum-selection bylaws can force
cases into Delaware only when the corporations want them
there. To get cases, Delaware must compete against other state
and federal courts. In that competition, the appeal of experienced, astute, and courteous judges goes only so far. What forum
shoppers want is to win their cases. If the Delaware Chancery
Court will not rubber stamp their settlements, the corporations
will seek approval from courts that will. 270 The problem, from
Delaware’s point of view, is that the Delaware Chancery Court
cannot give settling parties the rate of approvals they could
achieve through forum shopping while still maintaining the appearance of propriety. Yet that appearance is a crucial component of Delaware’s judicial strategy.
D. ARBITRATION BYLAWS
The biggest challenge to Delaware’s judicial strategy—arbitration bylaws—is yet to come. 271 Arbitration bylaws provide for
the resolution of internal corporate claims—particularly claims
by the shareholders against the corporation and its directors and
officers—through arbitration. Arbitration bylaws will be attractive to corporate managers because they can sharply reduce both
the level of shareholder litigation 272 and the publicity it receives.
Reduction in the level of shareholder litigation will result from
elimination of the principal incentive for bringing cases—fee
awards by courts to plaintiffs’ attorneys. 273 Reduction in the
level of publicity will result from the secrecy that is pervasive in
private arbitration.
Delaware probably cannot prevent its corporations from
adopting arbitration bylaws. The United States Supreme Court
270. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 254 (1979) (observing that “competing courts would
offer not a set of rules designed to optimize dispute resolution but a set designed
to favor plaintiffs regardless of efficiency”).
271. Brian JM Quinn, Arbitration and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate
Law Franchise, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 845 (2013) (“[I]t is entirely possible following a policy change at the SEC that Chancery-sponsored
arbitration could come into widespread use as a method for stemming shareholder litigation.”).
272. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013)
(“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).
273. If arbitration bylaws did not provide for the award of attorney’s fees to
successful plaintiffs, arbitrators would have no basis on which to award them.
See Beacon Towers Condo. Tr. v. Alex, 42 N.E.3d 1144, 1145 (Mass. 2016).
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has held that contracts for arbitration are enforceable, and that
federal policy preempts contrary state laws. 274 The Delaware
courts are irretrievably committed to the view that charters and
bylaws are contracts between the corporation and its shareholders, 275 leaving Delaware little room to insist that arbitration bylaws are not arbitration contracts protected by federal law.
Arbitration bylaws present an existential threat to Delaware. The threat is that public companies will adopt bylaw or
charter provisions that provide for the arbitration of shareholder
litigation—leaving the Chancery Court without cases. Once a
sufficient number of companies have done so, arbitration providers could replicate every feature of the Delaware court system,
including specialized judges, speedy dockets, abundant precedent, and even appeals—except fee awards and public access.
Corporations would no longer have any incentive to litigate in
public.
In addition to eliminating fee awards and public access,
companies and their managers might prefer arbitration to the
Delaware court system for three other reasons. First, arbitrations could occur in locations convenient to the parties and their
attorneys—including cyberspace. Because the arbitrations
would not be in the Delaware courts, the parties would not need
to be represented by members of the Delaware bar. Second, the
companies and their managers could write their own procedures
and tailor them to different kinds of cases. Small cases could be
heard by a single arbitrator without the possibility of appeal,
while bet-the-company cases were heard by three arbitrators
with the possibility of appeal. If shareholders objected to the procedures, the companies and their managers could negotiate the
objections. Third, cases filed anywhere other than in the designated arbitration tribunal could be immediately dismissed, eliminating the problem of multidistrict litigation.276
274. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011) (“When
state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the
analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”).
275. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“As our Supreme Court has made clear, the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the
DGCL.”).
276. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2013) (acknowledging that “for
any large merger there are likely to be a number of plaintiffs’ attorneys filing
several competing and fundamentally related claims in multiple jurisdictions”).
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The widespread adoption of arbitration bylaws by Delaware
corporations would sharply reduce the amount of shareholder litigation on the Delaware Chancery Court’s docket. That court
would no longer be privy to new issues as they arose, and the
production of new precedent would slow. More importantly, because the Delaware bar would have less involvement in cases
and less contact with clients, they would be less able to advise
the Delaware legislature. The companies’ new lawyers would
have the information flow needed, but they might not have connections to Delaware that would make them loyal to the state.
The Delaware legislature would be flying blind. It could offer far
less advantage to companies in return for the premium price Delaware extracts for its incorporations.
Until recently, scholars believed that Delaware dominance
of American corporate law was secure for the foreseeable future. 277 That belief was based in large part on their assumption
that the competitor would be another state, in which case Delaware could simply match its offer. 278 But Delaware cannot offer
the advantages of arbitration. States cannot operate secret tribunals. States cannot require class-action waivers. The Delaware Chancery Court might be able to provide Chancellors at
locations convenient to the parties, and to conduct hearings and
trials by teleconferencing. But it would be providing these services in direct competition with private companies who did not
have to meet the requirements of due process—including public
access.
Public companies have already begun to adopt arbitration
bylaws, 279 and a few courts have upheld them under Maryland

277. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 624 (“Delaware looks to be in
better shape than ever.”); Klausner, supra note 26, at 847 (asserting that Delaware’s “lead in the charter market is likely to be permanent”).
278. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 557 (asserting that “Delaware
could ‘match’ by adopting the challenger ’s improved rules”); Klausner, supra
note 26, at 847 (stating that if another state adopted a law with benefits greater
than Delaware’s it is “difficult to imagine why Delaware would not meet the
competition and adopt the law as well”).
279. Allen, supra note 3, at 780–82 (naming six companies that have adopted
arbitration bylaws).
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law. 280 Potential issues regarding their adoption remain unsettled, but the objections are weak.281 One of those issues—asserted by the SEC staff—is that arbitration bylaws are impermissible waivers of compliance with the federal securities
laws.282 The SEC’s objection probably does not apply to the arbitration of state law derivative actions. The SEC’s policy against
arbitration bylaws in public offerings may already have been reversed by the Trump administration. 283
In American Express v. Italian Colors, the Supreme Court
recently eliminated what might have been the strongest objection to arbitration bylaws—that they would de facto eliminate
the remedies of shareholders whose claims were so small that
they could only be brought as class actions. Instead, the court
said that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in
proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination
of the right to pursue that remedy.” 284
In 2015, Delaware put its defenses against arbitration bylaws in place. First, section 115 of the DGCL prohibits arbitration agreements contained only in certificates of incorporation or
bylaws. 285
280. Del. Cty. Empls. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014 WL
1271528, at *11 (D. Mass. Mar 26, 2014) (stating in dicta that the court would
uphold an arbitration bylaw adopted before the plaintiff purchased stock without knowledge of it); Katz v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 24-C13-001299, at 1–3
(Cir. Ct. Balt. Feb. 19, 2014); Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, No.
24-C-13-001111, at 27 (Cir. Ct. Balt. May 8, 2013).
281. Allen, supra note 3, at 770 (referring to the argument that an arbitration bylaw is substantive under Delaware law as “weak”); id. at 773–74 (dismissing the argument that mere purchase of stock is too flimsy a basis on which
to find a contract for arbitration).
282. Id. at 775–82; id. at 777 (arguing that “[t]he Staff ’s position is at odds
with United States Supreme Court precedent that an agreement to arbitrate is
not a waiver of substantive rights.”).
283. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC’s Piwowar Urges Companies To Pursue Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, REUTERS (July 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/usa-sec-arbitration/secs-piwowar-urges-companies-to-pursue
-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-idUSKBN1A221Y (reporting an SEC Commissioner ’s statement encouraging requests by corporations to include mandatory
arbitration provisions in public offering documents).
284. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
285. See Andrew Holt, Protecting Delaware Corporate Law: Section 115 and
Its Underlying Ramifications, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 209, 210 (2016) (stating
that section 115 “does ‘invalidate any provision selecting only non-Delaware
courts, or any arbitral forum’” (quoting Jack B. Jacobs, New DGCL Amendments
Endorse Forum Selection Clauses and Prohibit Fee-Shifting, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 17, 2015), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2015/06/17/new-dgcl-amendments-endorse-forum-selection
-clauses-and-prohibit-fee-shifting)).
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The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require . . . that any
or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively
in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims
in the courts of this State. ‘Internal corporate claims’ means claims,
including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon
a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction
upon the Court of Chancery. 286

But section 115 is in apparent conflict with section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The latter provides that written
agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable and enforceable.” 287 The United States Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen
state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type
of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule.” 288
Second, Delaware adopted the Delaware Rapid Arbitration
Act (DRAA). 289 The DRAA provides a highly expedited arbitration procedure that Delaware corporations can adopt by signed
agreement. 290 It authorizes the Chancery Court to appoint as arbitrators persons who have been Delaware lawyers for at least
ten years, 291 making DRAA arbitration potentially an arm of the
Delaware legal community and potentially a replacement for the
Delaware Chancery Court. If the parties do not specify the location of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator can decide whether
to hear it in Delaware or elsewhere. 292 But the DRAA’s requirement that the arbitration agreement be “signed” is apparently
intended to exclude arbitration bylaws. 293 As currently configured, the DRAA would not apply to most shareholder litigation
because the shareholders of public companies do not sign the
companies’ bylaws.

286. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2018).
287. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
288. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 334 (2011).
289. See Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5801–
5812 (2018).
290. Id. § 5803.
291. Id. § 5805(b)(2).
292. Id. § 5807(a).
293. H.B. 49, 148th Gen. Assemb. 2015 Sess. (Del. 2015), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/de-rapid-arbitration-act.pdf (Frequently Asked
Questions appended to bill) (“Specifically, the requirement that the arbitration
agreement is signed by all parties to the arbitration is meant to exclude the
possibility that provisions in a certificate of incorporation or by-laws would bind
stockholders who did not personally sign a document expressly agreeing to arbitration under the Act.”).
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If the courts invalidate section 115 of the DGCL, Delaware
could expand the DRAA to include bylaw-imposed arbitration.
But competing arbitration systems would not impose fee awards
on defendants, so Delaware could not do so and remain competitive. Without the award of fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys, the
change from class and derivative actions to arbitration would
sharply reduce the magnitude of shareholder dispute resolution,
perhaps leaving Delaware with too little for its new arbitrationbased strategy to be effective.
If the arbitration of internal corporate claims replaces litigation, Delaware’s judicial strategy may no longer be viable. The
next Part speculates on what would happen next.
III. THE COMPETITIVE MELTDOWN SCENARIO
Delaware’s Council 294 and most scholars 295 conceptualize
the charter competition as a contest to strike precisely the right
balance between the statutory rights of managers and shareholders. In fact, no American corporation statute strikes such a
balance. Corporation statutes are composed almost entirely of
default rules.296 The better conceptualization is that state corporation statutes allow managers and shareholders to strike precisely the right balance by contract. The balance struck heavily
favors managers because, as the entity’s initiators, they initially
possess all the power and can cede to shareholders only as much
as they consider necessary to attract investment.

294. See COUNCIL EXPLANATION, supra note 27, at 11 (referring to “the careful balance that the State has strived to maintain between the interests of directors, officers, and controlling stockholders, and the interests of other stockholders”).
295. Fisch, supra note 193, at 1676 (reporting University of Delaware Professor Charles Elson’s comment that “the Delaware legislature sought to maintain a corporate law that balanced the interests of shareholders and managers”);
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 739–40 (“Because both managers and shareholders influence incorporation decisions, Delaware can benefit from designing
its product to be attractive, if not equally so, to both shareholders and managers
of as many corporations as possible.”); Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation:
From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 537 (2005) (“[ F ]irm managers are constrained by market forces to seek out corporate law that is best for investors.”);
Winter, supra note 60, at 256 (“States seeking corporate charters will thus try
to provide legal systems which optimize the shareholder-corporation relationship.”).
296. But see Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 383, 384 (2007) (asserting the dominant view is
that “most corporate law rules” are default rules).
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But if one considers not merely the statutes but the entire
corporation-law packages of the states, Delaware is arguably an
exception. Delaware’s judicial strategy uses purportedly mandatory rules regarding fiduciary duty to regulate in a variety of areas. That use is disingenuous, serving Delaware’s interests and
public decorum by appearing to regulate more than it does. Nevertheless, Delaware’s courts do, to some degree, balance the
rights of managers and shareholders.
Competing states have been unable to match Delaware’s
charade because they lack chancery courts. But so long as Delaware can plausibly maintain that it enforces high fiduciary
standards, the other states cannot abandon the pretense that
they also enforce such standards. Abandoning that pretense of
enforcement would risk the respectability of their charters and
perhaps detract from the respectability of the states themselves. 297
If Delaware’s judicial strategy were to fail and the cases migrate to secret arbitration, the states’ need to maintain a regulatory facade would disappear. Delaware could no longer have
one standard on the books and enforce a different one in its
courts. Given a choice between a statute with fiduciary constraints that would be enforced by neutral arbitrators and a statute with no constraints at all, managers would choose the latter.
Delaware would have to make the same choice.
To abandon the cloak of pseudo-regulation, a state’s corporation law might provide that “the certificate of incorporation
and the bylaws shall govern the relations among the shareholders, the directors, the officers, and the corporation. To the extent
the certificate of incorporation and the bylaws do not provide for
a matter, this Act governs.” 298 To go a step further, the law of a
state seeking to compete with Delaware might provide that “to
the extent that the Delaware General Corporation Law grants
any right, privilege or ability to Delaware corporations, corporations of this state shall have the same rights, privileges and abilities.” The corporation and its shareholders could agree to abolish shareholder litigation, 299 to litigate in the courts of the most
297. Nevada apparently decided to take the risk, by largely eliminating director ’s fiduciary duties. Barzuza, supra note 111, at 936 (“In offering lax corporate law, Nevada capitalizes on its reputation as a lax regulator.”).
298. I took this language from the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 105 (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2013), changing only the entity type.
299. Abolition might or might not be effective, but effectiveness would not
depend on the contents of the state’s corporation law.
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convenient state or states (which might include Delaware), 300 or
to submit their disputes to arbitration.301 By enacting such provisions, a state would immediately achieve contractarian efficiency with respect to its corporate law.
Of course, establishing the relationship between the corporation and the state would still require some mandatory rules.
They include the rules authorizing the Secretary of State to
maintain records and make them available, the rules requiring
corporations to furnish information and pay fees and taxes, and
the rules specifying the penalties for failure to comply. But the
relationships among the corporation and its officers, directors,
and shareholders—including their preferred manner of dispute
resolution—would be established by contract.
From the perspective of domestic corporations, a state’s
adoption of this contractarian strategy would be hardly noticeable. Existing corporations could keep the certificates of incorporation and bylaws they already have. Except for the addition of
the two or three sentences set forth above,302 the state’s corporation statute could remain the same. The effect of the changes
would be merely that any mandatory rules that governed the relationship among the corporation and its officers, directors, and
shareholders would have become default rules. Few mandatory
rules exist in American corporation laws anyway.
Adoption of the contractarian strategy would fundamentally
change the corporate charter competition. The states currently
purport to compete in large part on the basis of their corporatelaw expertise, as reflected in the supposed quality of their corporate laws and judicial decisions. To compete by the contractarian
strategy, a state needs no corporate-law expertise. The corporations, institutional shareholders, and shareholder advisory services would supply the expertise. Because it would, for the first
300. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides:
All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him or her
in his or her reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions,
shall have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered
according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land, without
sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2018) provides that “[t]he Court of Chancery
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity.”
Any chartering state could provide that by incorporating in the chartering state,
the corporation and its officers and directors submit to the jurisdiction of the
Delaware Court of Chancery.
301. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 751 (discussing the availability of arbitration).
302. See supra text accompanying note 298 and the following sentence.
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time, be clear which rules of corporate law were mandatory and
which were default, a corporation incorporated in a contractarian state could elect to have the default rules of any state or private body apply. The debate over what rules were best would
continue, but the states would no longer participate. 303
In competing against the contractarian strategy, Delaware
would gain little advantage from lawyers’ knowledge of Delaware law or Delaware’s body of judicial precedent. Corporations
formed in other states could adopt the portions of Delaware law
they wanted and sweep away the rest merely by drafting charter
or bylaw provisions that said so.
A state’s adoption of the contractarian strategy would not
solve all of its competitive problems. The state would still have
to maintain an agency that sold charters, collected fees, taxes,
and information, and made the corporate information available
to law enforcement, paying customers, and the general public.
The state would have to be competitive in that realm. But, like
enacting a corporation law composed of only default rules, operating a corporate-records website requires no corporate-law expertise.
Explicit adoption of the contractarian strategy by a single
state would provide that state with an advantage in charter competition against Delaware, Nevada, and other states whose statutes continued to contain mandatory rules. Perhaps more importantly, it would provide the state with an advantage in
competing for business activity by demonstrating once and for
all the state’s business friendliness. I consider it reasonably clear
that if a state adopted the contractarian strategy, it would attract both national attention and public-company incorporations.
To predict the effect of a state’s adoption of the contractarian
strategy on the charter competition system is more difficult. The
first step is to predict the optimal strategic responses of the other
states. To do that by the systems-strategic method requires a reiterative process—predict tentative initial responses, project
where they lead, and then consider whether knowing the results
would change the initial responses.
To illustrate, assume that after the first state’s adoption of
the contractarian strategy, other states followed. Because the
corporate laws of those states would be identical—imposing no
303. Translated to game theory, the corporate charter competition would
then be a prisoner ’s dilemma problem.
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regulation at all—competition among them would be confined to
(1) price, that is, taxes and fees for incorporation in the state;
and (2) the quality of the states’ corporate administrators. Delaware might amend its laws to prevent foreign corporations from
using the Delaware courts, and rely on the quality of its courts,
combined with an assumed illegality of arbitration, to retain its
corporations. But if those defenses failed, the competition might
melt down to a new level of triviality. To corporations, the states
would no longer be providers of corporate law. Corporate law
would be the contents of the articles or certificates of incorporation.304 The states would be mere websites in price competition
to register and verify the corporations’ existences.
To the states, corporations would no longer be providers of
filing fees and tax revenues. Prices would decline to approach
the costs of operating the states’ websites. The least efficient
states might even continue to compete at a loss in order to save
face. If this projection is correct, no state would benefit from the
contractarian strategy in the long run. But it does not necessarily follow that no state should pursue it.
Until events unfolded, the states could not be sure the projection was correct. Delaware’s courts might prove to be a durable advantage, preventing a complete meltdown. Other states
may or may not be able to free-ride on Delaware’s courts or to
offer arbitration as an alternative. In the midst of this uncertainty, it makes more sense for a state that wants to compete for
charters to be the first mover rather than hope that all states
will refrain. Even if a state’s adoption of a contractarian corporate statute merely provoked a federal takeover of corporate
chartering, the state provoking it would have proven itself the
most business friendly. Thus I conclude that it makes sense for
a state to adopt a contractarian corporation law now.
CONCLUSION
The principal functions of the corporate charter competition
are to deregulate corporate law and to insulate the deregulation
from political reversal. The system deregulates by allowing the
managers of each corporation to choose the state that regulates
304. This transformation has already occurred with respect to fiduciary duties in Delaware LLCs and limited partnerships. Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., 159 A.3d 242, 245 (Del. 2017) (“Another benefit under Delaware law
is the ability to eliminate common law duties in favor of contractual ones,
thereby restricting disputes to the four corners of the limited partnership agreement (‘LPA’).”).
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the corporation and—through the mechanism of the internal affairs doctrine—requiring all other states to acquiesce.
State benefits from competition are sufficiently large that
several states compete actively. Even the noncompeting states
conform their corporate laws to the corporate laws of the competing states. Earlier scholarship had assumed that, if states
competed at all, they did so to gain filing fee and tax revenues.
The states’ primary motive—to attract business activity—went
unnoticed. Except in Delaware, incorporations are not themselves significant business activity. But competing for incorporations is a means by which the states demonstrate their businessfriendliness and thereby attract other business activity.
More than a century of charter competition has produced
corporate law devoid of meaningful regulation. If a state imposed
meaningful regulation on managers, managers would reincorporate to a state that did not.
Charter competition purports to be a system that generates
law reflecting the combined preferences of corporate stakeholders and the state and federal governments. But in reality, charter competition reflects only the managers’ preferences to be free
from meaningful regulation. That is, regardless of other stakeholders’ preferences, charter competition would produce the
same product. The system’s design assures that at least one state
will always be willing to modify its corporation laws to appeal to
managers, that managers will be able reincorporate if necessary
to avoid regulation, and that corporations will remain unregulated. Deregulation is the only result the competition’s design
can produce.
Charter competition is effectively beyond democratic control. That is, no path exists by which citizens or their representatives could impose meaningful regulation on corporations without first making other difficult or impossible changes. Charter
competition is therefore a system in which corporations, not citizens or their representatives, hold the power to regulate.
Delaware dominates the charter competition by leveraging
its unique Chancery Court. Unlike the courts of other states, the
Chancery Court is significantly specialized in corporate law,
publishes its opinions, has a large body of precedent, tries cases
without juries, and has the resources and motivation to provide
quick hearings. In reliance on its judicial advantage, Delaware
enacted a vague, complex, and incomplete corporation law.
Those qualities have made it possible for Delaware judges to re-
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solve cases based largely on the interests of managers and Delaware. The litigation provided work for Delaware lawyers and enabled them to develop corporate expertise. Because they had
that expertise, the state gave its lawyers control over the legislative process with respect to corporate law.
Delaware’s highly successful judicial strategy now appears
to be unraveling. Beginning in 2001, Delaware Chancery Court
cuts to the fees of plaintiffs’ attorneys began making it difficult
for that Court to attract cases. In 2010, the Court changed strategies by encouraging corporations to adopt bylaws that required
plaintiffs’ attorneys to sue in Delaware. Delaware corporations
adopted those “forum selection” bylaws. But the corporations
have been reluctant to invoke them when the Delaware courts
seemed less likely than other courts to approve their questionable settlements. If the Delaware courts do not approve questionable settlements, the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the Delaware corporations will take the cases to other courts that will. If the
Delaware courts do approve questionable settlements, Delaware’s reputation and the charter competition’s legitimacy may
be impaired. Either way, Delaware is in trouble.
Arbitration bylaws may be Delaware’s coup de grace. Corporations have already begun adopting them and United States
Supreme Court opinions prevent the states from banning their
use. Delaware cannot compete with private arbitration companies by converting its judges into arbitrators. Corporations want
secret arbitration, but the Constitution prohibits Delaware
judges from providing secrecy.
Nor would the expansion of Delaware’s Rapid Arbitration
Act to unsigned arbitration provisions in certificates and bylaws
solve Delaware’s problem. Arbitration bylaws will not merely
move the same cases to a different forum. Arbitration bylaws can
and will bar plaintiffs from proceeding in representative capacities and bar arbitrators from providing fee awards to successful
plaintiffs. Because most plaintiffs who bring shareholder litigation do not individually have enough money at stake to warrant
even the cost of arbitration, the system’s shift to arbitration will
sharply reduce the number of cases brought.
Without enough cases, Delaware’s judicial strategy would
fail, leaving that state with little advantage over competing
states. Competing states may seize the opportunity by adopting
statutes that allow certificate of incorporation and bylaw provisions to displace the provisions of their corporation laws to the
full extent of the internal affairs doctrine. Because states need
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no corporate law expertise to enact such a statute and their
courts need no corporate law expertise to enforce arbitration
awards, Delaware’s history, familiarity, networks, and precedent would count for little. Corporate charter competition might
turn solely on price and the quality of the states’ websites. No
state could gain significant revenues in so competitive an environment. But charter competition would still provide a forum in
which the states could demonstrate their business friendliness,
and by doing so attract significant business activity.
Thus, even without Delaware and without charter competition revenues for Delaware’s successors, corporate charter competition would continue. The structure of the competition is its
root cause, and that structure remains stable: corporations can
incorporate anywhere. Once incorporated, corporations can do
business anywhere. The law of the incorporation state governs
their internal affairs. Until at least one of those three fundamental and long-standing principles is abandoned, corporate charter
competition will prevent meaningful regulation of corporations.

